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Abstract 
In this research, a risk-based shutdown inspection and maintenance interval 
optimization for a processing facility is proposed. Often inspection and maintenance 
activities can’t be performed until the processing unit or plant is taken into a non-operational 
state, generally known as “shutdown”. Extensive work on inspection and maintenance 
interval estimation modeling is available in the concerned literature however, no to very 
limited application on shutdown inspection and maintenance modeling is observed for a 
continuous operating facility. Majority of the published literature deals to optimize individual 
equipment inspection and maintenance interval without considering the overall impact of 
plant unavailability due to shutdown. They all deal to optimize individual equipment 
inspection and maintenance interval considering cost, risk, availability and reliability. The 
efforts towards finding an optimal inspection and maintenance interval is not considered in 
these studies especially when it requires unit or plant to be in shutdown state from an 
operational state for performing inspection and maintenance. This topic is selected to bridge 
the existing gap in the available literature and to provide a means to develop a methodology 
to estimate the shutdown inspection and maintenance interval for a continuous processing 
unit or plant, rather an inspection and maintenance interval for each piece of equipment 
considering the overall asset availability, reliability and risk. 
A component failure due to wear or degradation is a major threat to asset failure in a 
processing facility. A carefully planned inspection and maintenance strategy not only 
mitigate the effects of age-based degradation and reduce the threat of failure but also 
minimize the risk exposure. Generally failure caused by wear or degradation is modeled as a 
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stochastic process. For an effective inspection and maintenance strategy, the stochastic nature 
of failure has to be taken into consideration. The proposed methodology aims to minimize 
the risk of exposure considering effect of failure on human life, financial investment and 
environment by optimizing the interval of process unit shutdown. Risk-based shutdown 
inspection and maintenance optimization quantifies the risk to which individual equipment 
are subjected and uses this as a basis for the optimization of a shutdown inspection and 
maintenance strategy. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Risk-based, Availability, Reliability, Safety, Failure consequences, Shutdown, 
Maintenance Scheduling Optimization, Genetic Algorithms  
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1  CHAPTER 1  
 
Introduction and Overview 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Processing industries such as oil and gas and petrochemicals are considered to be 
complex industries due to their size and production volumes. A process plant consists of 
equipment, machineries, systems or their integral parts or components (hard resources; such 
as pipes, heat exchangers, electric motors, pumps, turbine, vessel, columns, flow and control 
valves etc. etc.), controlling and monitoring software (soft resources) which provide a 
specific function or services. These hard and soft resources are generally called physical 
assets. These physical assets are a combination of many permanent or temporary components 
which are configured within the hierarchy of an asset. Performance of these assets depends 
on their reliability, operation and maintainability. Very often these components need to be 
removed, repaired, overhauled or replaced in order for the asset to keep functioning or 
deliver the output it is designed for. When an asset fail (partial or total) to perform its 
intended function, it may result in loss of production, poor quality products, financial losses 
and in some case, serious hazardous and environmental issues. These failures or breakdowns 
could be due to cracks, leakages, corrosion, erosion, heating, vibration and wear (age 
related). Failure to detect these symptoms and not inspecting or reacting to remove these 
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degraded mode or functionality may result in major asset breakdowns or serious catastrophic 
failures. 
A set of activities or actions which ensures that the asset is available to perform its 
intended function, in a cost effective manner is generally called maintenance. Proper and 
effective inspection and maintenance of the asset not only helps to sustain the reliability of its 
functioning but also to improve its availability and performance as required. Best inspection 
and maintenance strategy helps to detect the potential failure before it produce undesired 
event or down time e.g. emergency shutdown for corrective action. Gulati and Smith (2009) 
reported that maintenance is an act of maintaining, or the work of keeping an asset in proper 
operating condition. It may consist of performing maintenance inspection and repair to keep 
assets operating in a safe manner to produce or provide designed capabilities. These actions 
can be Preventive Maintenance (PM) and Corrective Maintenance (CM) actions. So, 
maintenance keeps assets in an acceptable working condition, prevents them from failing, 
and, if they fail, brings them back to their operational level effectively and as quickly as 
possible. 
1.2 Research Objective and Scope 
Inspection and maintenance activities are carried out aiming to improve the reliability 
and availability of the system. Nowadays, complexity and advancement in systems and 
equipment has increased significantly in Oil & Gas, Refineries and Petrochemical facilities. 
Due to this reason, inspection and maintenance activities are moving from the reactive and 
expensive mode (e.g., breakdown maintenance, failure-ﬁnding maintenance and corrective 
maintenance) to proactive based, cost effective and high service maintenance techniques and 
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approaches. Kobbacy et al. (2008) reported that a survey of some 34 companies was carried 
out in the UK, which indicated that around half of the work that was carried out by 
maintenance department was on repair; around a quarter was on preventive maintenance and 
5% on inspection and the remaining was on other type of maintenance actions including 
opportunistic maintenance, condition monitoring and design-out maintenance. Some of the 
planned inspection and maintenance activities require the facility to be in non-operational 
state, generally termed “shutdown”. Inspection and maintenance activities carried out during 
a shutdown are generally called shutdown, turnaround or outage maintenance. Majority of 
the inspection and maintenance methodology published in literature has presented 
optimization strategies without considering the overall impact of facility shutdown. This 
research tries to overcome this limitation and provide a novel solution to optimize shutdown 
interval with a risk-based approach. 
Unexpected failures of a component or equipment produce an unplanned or 
emergency shutdown (outage) of processing facilities which operate on a continuous basis. 
Loss of production and higher maintenance cost (due to unplanned nature) not only create 
significant financial impact but also customer dissatisfaction. Production loss, safety and 
environment issues due to unexpected failures can be minimized using an effective 
inspection and maintenance strategy. A risk-based shutdown for inspection and maintenance 
activities provides a cost effective strategy by using the information obtained from the study 
of failure mode and their consequences. It is a strategic decision for operating companies to 
bring a running plant into a state on non-operational state in order to carry out inspection and 
maintenance for components of the system in certain period over a planning horizon. 
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This research focuses on developing a risk-based shutdown inspection and 
maintenance interval optimization methodology for a processing facility. This methodology 
will help to identify a proper inspection and maintenance interval in view of the overall risk 
exposure (financial impact), and lead to avoid unwanted breakdowns in the facility.  
 
The specific research objectives of this work are: 
 
(1) To develop a framework to estimate risk-based shutdown inspection and 
maintenance interval 
(2) To develop a risk-based methodology to estimate shutdown interval 
considering system availability. 
(3) To develop a risk-based shutdown inspection and maintenance interval 
considering human error for a processing facility. 
(4) To develop a multi-constrained, bi-objective risk-based maintenance 
scheduling for a LNG gas sweetening unit. 
 
The endeavor of this research is to find the optimum shutdown interval to perform 
inspection and maintenance of a system such that the overall risk is minimized subject to a 
constraint on reliability and availability. The proposed methodology will provide a means to 
achieve the desired reliability and availability of the processing unit or facility under 
considered circumstances as illustrated in Figure 1-1: Overall research strategy. 
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Figure 1-1: Overall research strategy 
1.3 General Terminology and Definitions 
To better understand the concepts in this dissertation, basic definitions and 
terminology are discussed in the following sub-sections. 
1.3.1 Shutdown 
A duration in which a process facility is out of service and does not produce the 
desired outcome is termed as shutdown.  
Risk-based 
shutdown interval 
Framework to 
estimate risk-
based 
shutdown 
interval 
Risk-based 
shutdown 
interval 
considering 
human error 
Multi-
constraint, bi-
objective 
maintenance 
optimization  
using Genetic 
Algorithm 
Risk-based 
shutdown 
interval 
considering 
system 
availability 
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1.3.1.1 Planned/Scheduled Shutdown: 
Duffuaa and Daya (2004) and Lawrence (2012) have defined that a planned periodic 
shutdown (total or partial) of a processing unit or facility is the time taken to perform 
maintenance, overhaul and repair operations and to inspect, test and replace process materials 
and equipment. Planned/Scheduled shutdown can be classified as total and partial shutdown. 
1.3.1.2 Total Shutdown: 
In a total planned shutdown, the entire process facility is taken out of service. This 
type of shutdown causes serious negative financial impact on business operations due to 
production loss and shutdown maintenance cost (labor and spare parts). Generally, planning 
for total shutdown begins well in advance and includes stakeholders such as procurement, 
engineering, maintenance, operations, quality assurance, Health, Safety, and Environment 
(HSE), security and administration.  
1.3.1.3 Partial Shutdown: 
A partial shutdown is a scheduled short term shutdown. This type of shutdown is the 
result of critical equipment or process system deterioration for which the unit of the process 
facility has to be taken out for service. Generally, the duration of partial shutdown is short in 
nature. This type of shutdown may have some impact on the production rate, depending on 
the configuration of the plant. 
1.3.1.4 Extended Shutdown: 
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) publication (2004), 
mothballing or extended shutdown is to place the facility in a condition of preservation in 
order to prevent degradation and to maintain the facility or part of the facility for future 
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usage. Mothballing is characterized by the treatment afforded to major components. 
Components and systems to be preserved may be physically removed from the environment 
in which they have been operating to a new environment where they are protected from 
degradation.  
1.3.1.5 Emergency Shutdown: 
The emergency shutdown is an unscheduled event which is initiated in the event of 
safety and/or environmental related issues such as fire, spill, etc., or due to a sudden failure 
of certain component or equipment which may produce or result in the loss of production. 
Emergency shutdown is triggered either by the operators or the safety interlock systems 
installed, to avoid failure of sophisticated and complex equipment such as compressors, 
pumps, turbines, boilers, furnaces, vessels etc.  
1.3.2 Maintenance and Inspections: 
Maintenance and inspections are activities carried out with the aim to improve the 
reliability and availability of the equipment or system. Some of these activities are 
inspection, cleaning, lubricating, adjustment, alignment and/or the replacement of 
components carried out in order to reduce the risk of failure. Some of the most important 
maintenance approaches are reviewed briefly here. Figure 1-2 shows a broad classification of 
maintenance activities. 
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Proactive
 
Maintenance 
 
Operator based
 
Reactive
 
Preventive
 
Predictive
 
Risk-based
 
 
Figure 1-2: Types of maintenance 
 
1.3.2.1 Reactive Maintenance: 
Maintenance activities which are not planned and performed when an internal 
(inherent) or an external (operator-induced) failure is observed are called reactive 
maintenance. Run to failure, breakdown, corrective and emergency maintenance are reactive 
maintenance labeled as “unplanned”, having common characteristics with the objective to 
restore the equipment to a state in which it can perform its full intended function.   
1.3.2.2 Proactive Maintenance: 
Maintenance activities which are planned well in advance, to avoid any potential 
failure, whether internal (inherent) or external (operator-induced), are called proactive 
maintenance. Proactive maintenance is contrary to reactive maintenance. Preventive 
maintenance and predictive maintenance are proactive maintenance. 
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1.3.2.3 Preventive Maintenance: 
Duffua et al. (1999) and Dhillon (2002) reported that preventive maintenance can be 
defined as a series of planned tasks performed to counteract the known causes of potential 
failures of the intended function of an asset. Preventive maintenance can be planned based on 
time or usage. If the actual failure mechanism of an asset is known, certain maintenance 
action can be carried out and planned in advance to avoid failure. For example, if the failure 
mode is due to wear or usage and increases over a period of time, then the preventive 
maintenance will be time-based. The downside of preventive maintenance is that it increases 
system downtime as well as increases the possibility of induced failures which may 
negatively impact system availability and reliability. 
1.3.2.4 Predictive Maintenance: 
Duffua et al. (1999) reported that predictive maintenance can be defined as a series of 
planned tasks performed to counteract the unknown causes of potential failures of the 
intended function of an asset by monitoring or inspecting the health of the asset. This type of 
maintenance strategy is also referred to as condition-based or diagnostic based maintenance. 
This strategy is very useful when the probability of failure is constant regardless of time, age, 
or usage, and there is a gradual degradation from the onset of failure. Gulati (2009) reported 
that the "predictive" component stems from the goal of predicting the future trend of the 
asset's condition. This approach uses the principles of statistical process control and trend 
analysis to determine at what point in the future, maintenance activities will be appropriate 
and cost effective.  
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1.3.2.5 Reliability Centered Maintenance: 
RCM strategy was developed in the commercial aviation industry in the late 1960s to 
optimize maintenance and operational activities in order to preserve critical aircraft 
functions. This strategy was adopted and published in Maintenance Strategy Group 1 (MSG-
1), which was later approved by Federal Aviation Authority (FAA). In 1975, Department of 
Defense (DOD) directed that the MSG concept be labeled Reliability Centered Maintenance 
(RCM) and be applied to all major military systems (Gulati, 2009). Reliability centered 
maintenance is a proactive maintenance strategy which is based on an asset/system in its 
operating context to ensure safety, mission compliance, and system functionality. The 
process defines system boundaries and identifies functions, functional failures, and likely 
failure modes (Gulati, 2009). 
1.3.2.6 Opportunity Maintenance: 
Duffuaa and Daya (2004) reported that maintenance activities which are not planned 
well in advance but rather carried out when the opportunity arises are called opportunity 
maintenance. Very often, this type of maintenance is carried out when the process 
plant/equipment enters in a planned or un-planned shutdown to perform maintenance and 
inspection activities. Such defects that are pointed out during operation, but could not be 
repaired, are maintained during shutdown. 
1.3.2.7 Operator Based Maintenance: 
Stephens (2010) reported that in the operator-based maintenance strategy, plant or 
equipment operators, with help of formal training from maintenance department, can perform 
certain routine maintenance jobs such as house-keeping, equipment cleaning, protection from 
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dust, lubrication, routine inspection and routine adjustment as well as simple faults that can 
be easily taken care of by the production or operational staff. Telang et al. (2010) reported 
that operator driven maintenance strategy closes the gap between operation/production and 
maintenance and may help to achieve significant improvement in overall plant and 
equipment availability. 
1.3.3 Risk 
The word “risk” is widely used in the industries. This word is used to represent 
various conditions which are considered to be having a negative impact on the operating 
companies, such as business risk, economic risk, safety and environmental risk and injury or 
fatality risk. Risk is generally analyzed qualitatively or quantitatively. Kaplan and Garrick 
(1981) suggested that a qualitative risk analysis tries to answer three fundamental questions 
or the “set of triplets idea”: 
(1) What can go wrong? 
(2) How likely is it to happen? 
(3) What will be the consequences if it happens? 
Once all the scenarios are covered, these sets of scenarios can be represented as a set 
of triplets as shown in the following equation: 
                                (1-1) 
 
Further a quantitative risk is generally defined as the possibility of loss and injury and the 
degree of probability of such a loss. In this context, risk can be defined as: 
                                                       (1-2) 
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The result of a quantitative risk analysis produces a number in $ values/unit of time. This 
number is used by operating companies to decide their tolerance or acceptance criteria to 
meet their target or goal.  
1.3.3.1 Failure and reliability function 
All equipment, either static or rotating degrades as the time passes or ages in 
operation. This degradation may result in a failure of the equipment or system. Generally, 
reliability of an equipment or system is defined as the probability that it will perform its 
intended function under a specified condition for the specified period of time without failure. 
In contrast, the probability that the equipment is in a failed state and unable to perform its 
required function is a complement to reliability. Mathematically, this is represented as: 
For a given value of t,  
             (1-3) 
where, R(t) is referred to as reliability function, and F(t) is the probability that failure occurs 
before time t. 
             (1-4) 
1.3.3.2 Consequence of failure 
A failure or breach of containment can lead to various scenarios or hazards which 
may produces unwanted outcomes. Typically, in oil and gas or petrochemical industries, fire 
(Flash fire, Jet fire, Pool fire, and Fireball), and explosions (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor 
Explosion (BLEVE), Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE), and Confined Vapor Cloud Explosion 
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(CVCE)), are considered to be major hazards events which may lead to devastated outcomes 
for the operating companies. Figure 1-3 briefly represents possible scenarios. 
 
Figure 1-3: Failure consequence modeling 
These consequences are estimated in terms of asset damage, production loss, health 
safety and environment and various inspection and maintenance costs and measured in $ 
values as shown in  Figure 1-4. 
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Figure 1-4: Asset Failure Scenarios and Hazards 
1.3.4 Availability 
Asset intensive industries such as petrochemical and hydrocarbon processing 
facilities operate on a continuous basis; 24 hours a day and 365 days a year. In order to 
maintain operability to meet the shareholders demands and to continue producing the output, 
availability of these assets is vital. Availability is one of the key measurement or 
performance indices for these industries. Higher availability indicates higher utilization of the 
facility. Ebeling (1996) defines availability as the probability that a system or component is 
performing its required function at a given point in time or over a stated period of time when 
operated and maintained in a prescribed manner. Availability is measured as the ratio of 
uptime and downtime of the facility, and represented as:  
               
      
               
 (1-5) 
 
   
15 
 
where, uptime and downtime are generally represented in terms of mean time between failure 
(MTBF) and mean time to repair (MTTR). Using MTBF and MTTR, the availability 
equation can be represented as: 
               
    
         
 (1-6) 
 
1.3.5 Risk based Inspection and Maintenance (RBI&M): 
Maintenance strategies such as breakdown maintenance, preventive maintenance, 
condition monitoring and reliability centered maintenance were the main focus for reducing 
maintenance cost and improving plant operational reliability and availability. However, over 
the last two decades, a paradigm shift has been observed in which maintenance strategies are 
now coupled with the risk associated with the operating plants. A risk-based approach, 
compared to a fixed interval (conventional) approach, assesses the failure by considering not 
only the likelihood but also the consequences of total shutdown and failure. 
1.4 Constraints and Limitations 
The proposal is based on a risk-based analysis. Quantification of risk requires having 
thorough understanding of equipment or system failure mechanism and failure probability. 
To calculate the failure probability of a component, equipment or system, failure data are 
required. Failure probabilities are primarily determined using physical plant data, test data, 
data banks and from the operating experience of plant personnel. Analyzing data without 
knowing the failure mechanism can lead to incorrect results. Depending on the availability of 
plant specific numerical data, failure rates can be estimated using the maximum likelihood 
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method, Bayesian reliability estimation or from a generic data base, if no raw data are 
available for a component. Some available industry databases e.g., Offshore and Onshore 
Reliability Data (OREDA) and Process Equipment Reliability Database (PERD), have 
documented failure and repair rates for different failure modes. In general, careful 
consideration is required in using this data since many of the failure modes are not applicable 
to all the processes. In this proposal, failure data for the selected critical equipment will be 
adopted from the available data banks, plant specific data as well as expert judgments. 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
This thesis follows the sequence of objectives as discussed earlier. The Chapter 
structure is discussed as follows:  
 Chapter 1 provides a brief introduction of the relevant terminologies discussed, such 
as shutdown and its types, inspection and maintenance and their types, operation 
performance measurements such as reliability, availability, and risk. Further, 
assumptions, limitations, research objectives are also mentioned.  
 Chapter 2 discusses a novel framework to estimate risk-based shutdown interval for a 
processing facility. This chapter includes a discussion on the introduction of a risk-
matrix for critical equipment selection to develop shutdown interval. Further, failure 
and consequence modeling for various failure scenarios is discussed and presented. 
Finally an operational risk profile is generated which is used considering the As Low 
As Reasonably Practical (ALARP) criteria to establish the shutdown interval. The 
proposed framework is applied and discussed to develop shutdown maintenance and 
inspection intervals for a gas chilling/liquefaction unit in a LNG processing plant. 
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 Chapter 3 describes the risk-based methodology to estimate shutdown interval 
considering system availability. Shutdown interval using plant availability as a 
constraint is discussed using Markov process. Availability of the system is estimated 
considering two different system configurations. Probabilities of failure and their 
consequences are presented. A novel concept of Mean Shutdown Time (MSDT) is 
proposed over the design life of the system, considering that the shutdown is a 
planned event in advance to obtain risk-based shutdown interval.  
 Chapter 4 presents a novel risk-based methodology to estimate shutdown inspection 
and maintenance interval by integrating human errors. Probability of human error is 
introduced while modeling the system failure. Success Likelihood Methodology 
(SLIM) is used to estimate the human error probability (HEP). The proposed 
methodology is the extension of the previously published work by the authors to 
determine the shutdown interval, considering the system desired availability. The 
methodology is used to ensure the practicality of the proposed formulation to the real 
industry. 
 Chapter 5 presents a multi-constrained, bi-objective non-linear maintenance 
scheduling optimization using Genetic Algorithm (GA). Further, in this chapter, the 
facility is split in to two main categories of equipment which help to develop a well-
planned maintenance, considering planned shutdown and its financial impact. The 
benefits of maintenance can only be gained when a reliable performance with high 
availability and productivity is sustained without having frequent facility shutdowns. 
The two conflicting objectives are: i) the minimization of total expenditures incurred 
on maintenance related activities and ii) improving the total reliability of gas 
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sweetening unit. Finally a true Pareto-front using plant specific data and employing 
Genetic Algorithm Toolbox in MATLAB (Version 2015b) is presented. The 
developed approach is applied to construct the maintenance schedule for a processing 
facility unit. 
 Finally, Chapter 6 presents the research conclusions with the key findings, presented 
novelties and contributions for the operating facility shutdown management. Further, 
possible opportunities to improve the shutdown modeling are also suggested to take 
this subject to the next higher level.  
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2 CHAPTER 2 
 
A framework to estimate the risk-based shutdown interval 
for a processing plant
1
 
 
Abstract 
The proposed framework is a cost effective way to minimize the overall financial risk 
for asset inspection and maintenance, while fulfilling safety and availability requirements. 
Petrochemical plants and refineries consist of hundreds of pieces of complex equipment and 
machinery that run under rigorous operating conditions and are subjected to deterioration, 
over a time due to aging, wear, corrosion, erosion, fatigue and other reasons. These devices 
operate under extreme operating pressures and temperatures, and any failure may result in 
huge financial consequences for the operating company. To minimize the risk and to 
maintain operational reliability and availability, companies adopt various maintenance 
strategies. Shutdown or turnaround maintenance is one such strategy. In general, shutdown 
                                               
1 This Chapter is based on the published work in a peer-reviewed journal. Hameed A., & 
Khan, F. (2014). “A framework to estimate the risk-based shutdown interval for a processing plant”. 
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 32, 18–29. To minimize the duplication, all the 
references are listed in the reference list. The contribution of the authors is presented in Section 
titled, “Co-authorship Statement”. 
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for inspection and maintenance is based on the original equipment manufacturer’s (OEM) 
suggested and recommended certain periods. However, this may not be the most optimum 
strategy given in which operating conditions may vary significantly from company to 
company. 
The framework proposed in this work estimates the risk-based shutdown interval for 
inspection and maintenance. It provides a tool for maintenance planning and decision making 
by considering the probability of the equipment or the system for failure and the likely 
consequences that may follow. The novel risk-based approach is compared with the 
conventional fixed interval approach. This former approach, characterized as it is by 
optimized inspection, maintenance and risk management, leads to extended intervals between 
shutdowns. The result is the increase in production and the consequent income of millions of 
dollars. 
2.1 Introduction 
Petrochemical plants and refineries consist of several pieces of equipment and 
machinery that are complex and run under rigorous operating conditions. They tend to 
deteriorate over time, due to aging, wear, corrosion, erosion, fatigue and other reasons. If the 
consequences of a failure are very low, the minimum amount of maintenance activity can be 
performed at the time of a failure. However, if the consequences of a failure are very high 
and are not addressed in a timely manner, the deterioration of equipment and system may 
result in unplanned shutdowns, production losses, higher production costs and in certain 
cases serious accidents and environmental issues.  
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To keep these losses low by minimizing the deterioration rate associated with time 
and operation, companies adopt different maintenance strategies by which to maintain the 
safety, reliability and availability of the systems, so that they may continue to operate 
smoothly. Shutdown maintenance is one of the maintenance management strategies used in 
process plants to improve the plant reliability, availability and integrity. Reliability is very 
important for any processing plant given that any equipment failure may result in safety 
consequences (e.g., injuries or loss of life and the company’s reputation), financial damages 
(e.g., production losses and damages to assets) and environmental consequences. Some of the 
planned inspection and maintenance activities cannot be performed if the plant is operational 
and require the unit or plant to be in a non-operational state. This category of maintenance is 
referred to as shutdown, turnaround or outage maintenance. Lawrence (2012) reported that 
refineries and other petrochemical facilities that run continuously must shut down operations 
every few years to provide access to production units so that essential maintenance, 
modification and inspection work can be carried out. To achieve a predefined operational 
reliability goal, companies adopt preventive maintenance strategies based on the original 
equipment manufacturer’s suggested fixed intervals of maintenance. However, these 
suggested intervals may not be the most optimum maintenance strategy, given that the 
operating conditions may vary significantly from company to company. Based on case 
studies performed for six major process plants in the United Kingdom, Obiajunwa (2012) 
reported that typically power plant shutdown (turnaround) maintenance is planned for every 
four years, oil refinery and petrochemical plant shutdown maintenance is planned for every 
two years, and chemical, steel, glass and food and beverage plant shutdown maintenance is 
planned for every year. Tan and Kramer (1997) reported that a typical refinery experiences 
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approximately 10 days of downtime per year due to equipment failures, with an estimated 
economic loss of $20,000-$30,000, per hour. Shutdown maintenance is critical to oil and gas 
companies as the availability of operating facilities has a major impact on the company’s 
profitability through the cost of the event and the revenue loss due to the plant being offline. 
The average production losses due to planned shutdowns based on a fixed interval strategy 
have a significant financial impact amounting to millions of dollars, which can be minimized 
by adopting a risk-based shutdown interval strategy.   
If the system deterioration can be modeled, it is possible to predict the time for 
failure, and maintenance action can be planned on the basis of the service age and the 
anticipated failure time. A risk-based shutdown maintenance interval methodology not only 
extends the interval between shutdowns but also produces millions of dollars in savings. 
2.2 State-of-the-art on shutdown inspection and maintenance: 
In recent years, shutdown maintenance strategies have emerged as a critical 
management decision to achieve optimal output for a unit or a plant, while keeping the 
overall costs low and maintaining safety and regulatory requirements. In the last two 
decades, a paradigm shift (risk-based maintenance strategies) has been observed, in which 
maintenance strategies are now coupled with the specific risk associated with the operating 
plant. It is likely that this reason that has influenced researchers to focus more on risk-based 
maintenance management approaches. Different risk-based maintenance and inspection 
approaches are reported in the literature, ranging from the qualitatively ones to the 
quantitative ones. Duffua and Daya (2004) reported that shutdown maintenance (also termed 
as turnaround maintenance) is a periodic maintenance where plants are shutdown to allow 
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time for inspections, repairs, replacements and overhauls, that can be carried out only when 
the assets (plant facilities) are taken out of service. During this period, three types of work 
are carried out: (1) work on equipment that cannot be performed unless the whole plant is 
shutdown, (2) work that requires a lengthy maintenance and a large number of maintenance 
personnel and (3) maintenance on defects that are discovered during normal operations but 
cannot be repaired. Duffua, Raouf, and Cambell (1999), and Lenahan (1999) both 
extensively discussed detailed requirements for shutdown (turnaround) maintenance. 
Pokharel and Jiao (2008) reported that if project management practices and the involvement 
of external experts and parties are allowed during maintenance projects, then issues in 
maintenance projects can be more clearly addressed and the cost and schedule for such a 
project can be minimized. Levitt (2004) discussed five phases of shutdown: planning, 
initiating, executing, completion and closeout. Duffua et al. (1999), Duffua and Daya (2004), 
Lenahan (1999) and Levitt (2004) covered only the management and execution portions of 
shutdown and have not addressed the important question regarding shutdown intervals to 
improve plant reliability and availability. Zulkipli et al. (2009) reported that the studies 
regarding turnaround (shutdown) maintenance are descriptive and highly narrative in nature. 
The shutdown (turnaround) event is considered duration-driven, and the frequency is largely 
determined by variables such as plant technology, the required level of plant reliability, and 
the legal requirements associated with the operation. Ghosh and Roy (2009) proposed 
optimizing the maintenance intervals by maximizing the reliability based cost/benefit ratio. 
Rusin and Wojaczeck (2012) presented optimization of power machine maintenance intervals 
by taking the risk into consideration. Vaurio (1995) presented a procedure for optimizing test 
and maintenance intervals for safety related systems and components. This procedure was 
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based on minimizing the total plant-level cost and setting an upper bound, on the total 
accident frequency (risk). Khan and Haddara (2003) developed a risk-based maintenance 
(RBM) strategy interval for periodic preventive maintenance (PM) on key equipment. Khan 
and Haddara (2004a, 2004b) applied the risk-based maintenance (RBM) strategies to 
offshore oil and gas processing facilities to develop a maintenance plan and extended similar 
strategies to an ethylene oxide production plant. Krishnasamy, Khan and Haddara (2005) 
proposed a risk based maintenance strategy for a power plant. The strategies listed by Khan 
and co-authors are intended to develop an optimized inspection and maintenance program 
based on integrating a reliability approach and a risk assessment strategy. The desired end 
product is an optimum maintenance schedule that reduces the overall risk for the plants based 
on the individual equipment in the plant. However, these methods are deficient in 
considering the overall financial impact of plant shutdown on the facility and the frequency 
of the maintenance shutdown interval. Tan and Kramer (1997) proposed a general framework 
for preventive maintenance optimization that combines Monte Carlo simulations with a 
genetic algorithm. When applied to opportunistic maintenance problems, the method 
overcomes the demonstrated shortcomings using analytic or Markov techniques in terms of 
solution accuracy, versatility and tractability. Duarte, Craveiro, and Trigo (2006) proposed 
optimizing the preventive maintenance plans of a series of components to ensure availability 
under the assumption that all of the components in the system exhibit a linearly increasing 
hazard rate, a constant repair rate and that preventive maintenance returns the system to ‘as 
good as new’ condition. Vatn, Hokstand, and Bodsberg (1996) presented an overall model 
for maintenance optimization for the components of a production system considering safety, 
health, maintenance costs, environment objectives and the cost of lost production. Keshavarz, 
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Thodi, and Khan (2011) proposed a risk-based shutdown management strategy for LNG 
units. A combination of preventive maintenance, active redundancy and standby redundancy 
was considered to achieve an optimized shutdown maintenance strategy. This work failed to 
address the equipment selection criteria for the shutdown interval characterization of the 
plant, which is a key issue as far as optimizing the shutdown maintenance interval is 
concerned. Hadavi (2009) proposed a heuristic single function model incorporating cost, risk 
and loss for outage maintenance scheduling optimization. Fujiyama et al. (2004) developed a 
risk based maintenance system for steam turbine plants coupled with a quick inspection 
system. The objective was to provide a rational basis for life cycle maintenance planning. 
Tam, Chan, and Price (2006) reported that in the manufacturing industry, PM is carried out to 
minimize the probability of unexpected plant breakdown. Suggested PM intervals are 
normally determined by the OEMs. However, they observed that due to the multi-faceted 
relationship between the operating context and the production requirements for different 
plants, it is unlikely that these OEM suggested intervals are optimized for plant specific 
conditions. Additionally, these authors proposed three models to calculate the optimal 
maintenance intervals for a multi-component system in a factory with a minimum required 
reliability, maximum allowable budget and minimum total cost. 
API Recommended Practice 580 (2009) provides guidance to owners, operators, and 
designers of pressure-containing equipment, including pressure vessels, process piping, 
storage tanks, rotating equipment (with pressure containing components), boilers and heaters, 
heat exchangers and pressure-relief devices. API Recommended Practice 581 (2008) 
provides quantitative procedures to establish an inspection program using risk-based methods 
for pressurized fixed equipment, including pressure vessels, piping, tankage, pressure relief 
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devices, heat exchangers, pumps and compressors. In literature, extensive work on inspection 
and maintenance modeling is available, however, very limited application is observed related 
to the modeling of shutdown for a processing unit or plant. Some of these methods have been 
discussed in details in literature to estimate optimal maintenance and inspection interval 
considering cost, risk, availability and reliability. However, they all tend to optimize 
individual equipment inspection and maintenance cycle. The efforts towards finding an 
optimal inspection and maintenance interval is not considered in these studies especially 
when it requires the unit or plant to be in non-operational (shutdown) state, from an 
operational state for performing inspection and maintenance on the equipment. If an 
inspection and maintenance strategy is developed only by giving consideration to individual 
equipment reliability and availability point of view, it will have a major impact on the return 
on investment for shareholders, lead to higher operating expenses and in some cases result in 
loss of market share. The Risk-based Shutdown Inspection and Maintenance Methodology 
(RBSIM) proposed in the present work, is a unique quantitative approach which enables us to 
find a unit or plant shutdown interval which will provide an optimal inspection and 
maintenance interval considering the overall system availability, reliability and risk. The 
proposed RBSIM is designed to optimize the plant shutdown interval and maintain a high 
level of equipment availability considering the critical equipment from the risk perspective, 
while ensuring that the overall financial impact is kept to a minimum, considering the critical 
equipment from risk perspective. RBSIM provides an efficient way to select the equipment 
based on the risk and direct impact on plant operability to manage assets in comparison to the 
individual equipment strategy by efficiently utilizing inspection and maintenance resources 
and thus achieve better results with less operating expenses. 
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2.3 Risk-based shutdown inspection and maintenance interval (RBSIM) 
methodology 
In this study, a framework to establish risk-based shutdown intervals is presented. 
This framework is broken down into three main modules, as shown in Figure 2-1: 
1. Risk-based equipment selection for shutdown interval estimation 
2. Estimation of failure data and failure consequences 
3. Establishing a risk-based optimized shutdown interval 
2.3.1 Module 1: Risk-based equipment selection for shutdown interval 
estimation. 
According to Zulkipli et al. (2009) tasks carried out during shutdown maintenance 
include overhauls, maintenance, replacement, inspection, tie-ins for plant expansions and 
modifications and upgrades. Duffua and Daya (2004) reported that during shutdown 
(turnaround), maintenance is performed on that equipment, which necessarily requires that 
the whole plant is shutdown and on defects that are discovered during operation that cannot 
be repaired or which require a lengthy repair period and a large number of maintenance 
personnel. 
To estimate the shutdown interval or provide enhancement, the focus must be placed 
on equipment failure probabilities that have the most significant impact on system failure. In 
a typical operating plant, thousands of pieces of equipment and components are operating. It 
is very unlikely that a shutdown interval can be based on all of the equipment. The overall 
financial impact of the shutdown for inspection and maintenance activities can be offset by 
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reducing excessive equipment selection by removing those pieces that exhibit a lower risk to 
reliability, availability and safety. 
Process industries such as oil, gas or petrochemical industries are exposed to risk 
which relates to financial losses due to losses in production and to operating risks associated 
with higher operating pressures, lower temperatures (cryogenic), as well as toxic and 
chemical hazards. To avoid or minimize these risks, risk-based equipment selection is 
proposed to help estimate the best risk-based shutdown intervals.  
This process begins with a qualitative risk-based study for equipment selection in 
reference to the imposed risk on the facility and the performance of the equipment. This 
module proposes a unique risk assessment strategy to select the critical equipment that 
affects the functionality of the system. To achieve this, operating plants need to be divided 
into manageable units/systems to identify pertinent equipment or components. To minimize, 
the exposed risk to the company, each unit needs to be analyzed, to identify the equipment 
with the largest impact on the plant operability, reliability, availability, financial impact (e.g., 
production loss, asset damage due to failure and revenue loss due to shutdown), as well as the 
possible impact on safety and the environment. This cycle continues until the whole unit or 
plant is analyzed. The output from this qualitative risk assessment is a categorization of the 
equipment that exhibits a significant impact on the operability of the unit or plant. 
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Figure 2-1: Frame work to estimate risk-based shutdown interval 
A qualitative criticality risk ranking matrix (see Figure 2-2: Qualitative Criticality 
risk ranking matrix) is proposed to select critical equipment which cannot be inspected or 
repaired if the plant is in operation. A level of severity and probability of failure from 1 to 5 
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is assigned to each category. For the case of several competing consequences for 
equipment/components, the highest observed risk among the consequences should be 
considered to be the most critical component. 
5
3
Risk Matrix
Failure Frequency
Frequent
Probable
Occasional
Remote
Extremely 
Unlikely
M H H H H
L M M H H
L M M M H
L L M M H
L L L L M
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1 2 3 4 5
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First Aid
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Disability
Permanent 
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No
effect
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effect
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4
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Figure 2-2: Qualitative Criticality risk ranking matrix 
Operational relationships and knowledge regarding various system elements is 
required to perform shutdown interval estimation. System failures cannot be evaluated and 
improved until it is known that how these various elements affect system operation. A true 
representation of these relationships is required for prediction and assessment based on either 
cost or risk. Reliability block diagrams are usually used to represent these relationships. For a 
system comprising various elements (equipment), reliability diagrams are a good means of 
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showing the functional relationship between the elements and providing an indication of the 
elements which must operate successfully for the system to accomplish its intended function. 
An operating plant may constitute pieces of equipment arranged in series, active redundancy 
or standby redundancy. Typical reliability block diagrams are shown below (Figure 2-3 & 
Figure 2-4). 
Equipment 1 Equipment 2 Equipment 3 Equipment n
 
Figure 2-3: Block diagram showing equipment acting in series 
 
Equipment 1 Equipment 2 Equipment 2Equipment n
Equipment 1
Equipment m
 
Figure 2-4: Block diagram showing equipment acting in series/parallel configuration 
 
Furthermore, this study assumes that a piece of equipment/component in standby 
arrangement or active redundancy has the full capacity to undergo inspection and 
maintenance without requiring, that the operating plant be placed into a non-operational state. 
2.3.2 Module 2: Estimation of system failure probability and failure 
consequences 
A failure of a piece of equipment or a system is defined as its inability to perform its 
intended function as per stated procedure in a defined environment. A partial failure may 
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result in a reduction of process throughput, whereas a complete failure will stop the entire 
process operation. Failures are generally modeled as a stochastic process. A stochastic 
process can be defined using a probabilistic method. Ebeling (1997) reported that the 
reliability of a piece of equipment or a system is defined as the probability that it will 
perform its intended function without failure for a given period of time. The failure of a piece 
of equipment or a system is complementary to the reliability and is written mathematically 
as: 
                   (2-1) 
 
                   (2-2) 
2.3.2.1 System Failure Probability: 
A failure can be modeled using exponential, Weibull, normal or lognormal 
probability distributions. However, Weibull distributions provide a more generalized failure 
model and often are used in reliability analyses due to this model’s inherent flexibility.  
Additionally, Weibull distributions can mimic the behavior of other statistical distributions, 
such as normal (for β =3.4) and exponential (for β =1) distributions. A decreasing failure rate 
(β<1) corresponds to an early life failure or infant mortality. A constant failure rate (β =1) 
suggests that items are failing from random events. An increasing failure rate (β>1) suggests 
that wear out is occurring and that parts are more likely to fail over time (Ghosh & Roy, 
2009). The value of the shape parameter (β) estimated from the failure data provides an 
insight into the failure processes of the equipment. This includes reliable operation for certain 
durations and when the device enters into the wear out zone. All maintenance activities are 
based on this assumption so that action can be taken before any failures occur. It is necessary 
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to express the probability of failure for a piece of equipment or a system as a function of time 
for risk-based shutdown maintenance and inspection interval estimation. In this study, the 
Weibull model with the parameters β and characteristic life (θ) is used to model the time 
dependent reliability of the equipment involved in the system. Ebeling (1997) reported that 
the reliability of equipment following the Weibull distribution is defined as: 
         
 
 
 
 
 
(2-3) 
 
 
      
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
 (2-4) 
The variable       is defined as the reliability of the equipment in a system that has 
not had any maintenance or inspection during a time t but is scheduled to undergo inspection 
and maintenance during a shutdown. Ebeling (1997) reported that the system failure 
probability prior to the shutdown maintenance and inspection is given as: 
For a System in a Series Configuration (Figure 2-3): 
                 
 
   
 (2-5) 
   
             
 
  
 
  
  (2-6) 
where i = 1, 2,….., n pieces of equipment acting in series, as shown in Figure 2-3, 
and: 
For System in Series/Parallel Configuration (Figure 2-4): 
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  (2-7) 
where i = 1, 2…n pieces of equipment acting in series and j=1, 2…m pieces of equipment 
acting in parallel, as shown in Figure 2-4. 
2.3.2.2 Estimation of failure probability parameters 
To calculate the failure probability of a component, equipment or a system, failure 
data are required. Noortwijk, Dekker, Cooke, and Mazzuchi (1992) proposed a 
comprehensive method to use expert opinion for obtaining the lifetime distributions required 
for maintenance optimization. Failure probabilities are primarily determined using physical 
plant data, test data, data banks and from the operating experience of plant personnel. 
Analyzing data without knowing the failure mechanism can lead to incorrect results. Cizelj, 
Mavko, and Kljenak (2001) reported that estimation of a component failure rate depends on 
the availability of plant specific numerical data and proposed a new method that explicitly 
adds numerical and linguistic information into the assessment of a specific failure rate using 
a Bayesian updating approach. Depending on the availability of plant specific numerical data, 
failure rates can be estimated using the maximum likelihood method, Bayesian reliability 
estimation or from a generic data base if no raw data are available for a component. For this 
study, failure data for the selected critical equipment are adopted from the OREDA (2002). 
Keshavarz et al. (2011) reported that by using different causes of failure, number of failures, 
and demand for equipment reported in OREDA, the reliability of any component may be 
calculated in the following way: 
               
 
 
 (2-8) 
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where n is the number of critical failures and N is the demand. 
As no information is listed in OREDA on the time of individual failures, it is fair to 
assume a constant mean time between failures for any specific cause. A simultaneous 
solution of Eq. (2-3) and Eq. (2-4) is used to obtain the distribution parameters β and θ for 
any piece of equipment.  
2.3.2.3 Economic failure consequences: 
Failure modes for process equipment (static or rotating) need to be assessed to 
perform inspection and maintenance activities. Maintenance activities can be as simple as 
lube oil analysis, lube oil replacement or a complete replacement of a degraded component. 
For example, a catastrophic failure of a pump bearing may result in damage to the casing, 
ring, impeller, and mechanical seal. A failure of a threaded drain connection due to corrosion 
in a process vessel may result in the release of a large amount of hydrocarbons. If a pump 
operating in a gas processing plant under extreme pressure or temperature fails 
catastrophically and releases hydrocarbons, it may form a vapor cloud and result in an 
explosion in the presence of an ignition source. The consequences of these failures are not 
only limited to mechanical damage of the equipment but may also cause significant damage 
to nearby assets, production loss, serious health and safety issues and environment impacts. 
These consequences can be calculated based on the effects of thermal radiation and 
overpressure on surrounding equipment and personnel and subsequently converted in the 
monetary ($) terms that are assumed to be invariant with time. Improper inspection or 
maintenance of processing units may result in severe failure consequences. The purpose of 
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risk-based shutdown maintenance and inspection interval modeling is to minimize the 
consequences of these failures by reducing the risk associated with deterioration or aging 
effects. The total economic consequences of these failures include asset losses, human health 
losses, production losses and the cost of maintenance and inspections. Each of these 
economic consequences is discussed briefly in the following section. 
2.3.2.4 Economic Consequences of Asset Loss (ECAL): 
To determine any damage to surrounding assets due to various hazards resulting from 
a hydrocarbon release, such as flash fires, jet fires, pool fires, fire balls, VCE, CVCE, 
BLEVE,  or toxic dispersion in a processing plant, consequence effect zones (m
2
) in terms of 
overpressure level are calculated to establish asset losses. The assessment of consequence 
effect zones and their impact involves many models, such as source modeling, dispersion 
modeling, fire and explosion models. A large number of computer software packages are 
available to perform these types of analyses. However, in this study, an analytical model is 
used to calculate overpressure in the effected zones due to an explosion (Crowl & Louvar, 
2002) and converted into probability of damage due to overpressure using probit analysis 
(Assael & Kakosimos, 2010). The main parameters required to perform these calculations are 
operating pressure, temperature, physical and chemical properties, and atmospheric 
conditions. Asset loss is estimated for each accident scenario using the following equation: 
                 (2-9) 
where PDOP is the probability of damage due to overpressure, EZ is the effected 
zone due to overpressure and AD is asset density.  
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2.3.2.5 Economic Consequences of Human Health Loss (ECHHL) 
The loss of life or pain suffered due to equipment failure or degradation has a severe 
impact on the operation of the facility and the operating company’s perception in the eyes of 
the public. Although it is difficult to calculate the impact of the loss of life or pain suffered to 
one’s family, the cost due to compensation and corporate liability needs be taken into 
account in terms of economic consequences, which vary from company to company. Judycki 
(1994) of the US Department of Transportation and the Federal Highway Administration 
published a technical note relating the injury scale (in terms of severity) to the 
comprehensive costs in police-reported crashes. The figures of this previous study are used 
hereinto calculate the financial impact on companies for human fatalities or injuries. 
Similar to the calculation of asset loss, human health loss is calculated in terms of 
dollars for each scenario using the following equation: 
                     (2-10) 
where PDOP is the probability of damage due to overpressure, EZ is the effected 
zone due to overpressure, PD is population density and CF is cost of injury or fatality. 
2.3.2.6 Economic Consequences of Production Loss (ECPL): 
The consequences of production loss are the product of downtime and the production 
loss volume: 
                (2-11) 
where SDT denotes the shutdown time in days, PL is production loss volume per day 
and SP is the selling price of the product per unit volume. 
The shutdown time includes the total amount of time, the plant would be out of operation 
(from the moment it is stopped to the moment it is again fully operational). 
   
38 
 
2.3.2.7 Economic Consequences of Shutdown Inspection and Maintenance Costs 
(ECSIM): 
Shutdown inspection and maintenance costs include scheduled inspection and 
maintenance costs for a group of equipment or components. These costs include the cost of 
preparation (scaffolding, insulation removal, blinding, purging, etc.), the cost of inspection 
(visual inspection, hydro jetting, eddy current testing, etc.), the cost of maintenance activities 
and materials (spare parts, maintenance materials, tools and vehicles associated with 
maintenance or inspection jobs), and the cost of technical support. 
2.3.2.7.1 Preparation cost: 
The preparatory cost can be estimated in the following manner: 
           (2-12) 
where Cp is the preparatory cost ($), Clp is the cost of preparatory maintenance labor 
per hour ($/h) and t1 is the duration of the work. 
2.3.2.7.2 Inspection cost: 
The inspection cost can be estimated with the following equation: 
                  (2-13) 
 
where Ci is the inspection cost ($), Cli is the cost of skilled inspection labor per hour 
($/h), Cie is the cost of inspection equipment per hour ($/h), t2 is the duration of the work and 
t3 is the duration of the required equipment. 
2.3.2.7.3 Maintenance cost: 
The maintenance cost can be estimated in the following manner: 
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               (2-14) 
where Cm is the maintenance cost ($), Clm is the cost of skilled maintenance labor per 
hour ($/h), Csp is the cost of spare parts consumed and t4 is the duration of the work. The cost 
of spare parts includes replacement parts, consumables, internally manufactured parts, parts 
sent out for repairs at vendor’s facilities, special equipment and treatments. Spare part cost 
can be drawn from the plant warehouse book. 
2.3.2.7.4 Technical support cost: 
The technical support cost can be estimated with the following equation: 
             (2-15) 
where Cts is the technical support cost ($), Clts is the cost of a technical support 
specialist per hour ($/h) and t5 is the duration of the work in hours. 
The economic consequences of shutdown inspection and maintenance are the 
following: 
                    (2-16) 
The total economic consequences of failure are the following: 
                            
 
   
      
(2-17) 
where i =1, 2, 3………, n is the equipment identified from the criticality matrix and 
considered for shutdown interval estimation. 
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2.3.3 Module 3: establishing risk-based optimized shutdown inspection and 
maintenance interval 
The risk-based plant shutdown inspection and maintenance interval optimization 
model is a mathematical model in which both the risks and the benefits of maintenance are 
quantified in terms of failure probability. 
Schon (1980) defined risk as a statement concerning the damage probability 
depending on both the frequency of occurrence and the extent of possible expected (either 
direct or indirect) damage to all kinds to life and health. The risk may be described by a 
suitable combination ( ) of the frequency of occurrence of an undesirable event with the 
probable extent of the damage expected upon occurrence. Muhlbauer (2004) wrote that the 
most commonly accepted definition of risk is often expressed as the following mathematical 
relationship: 
                                          (2-18) 
 
                                                   
(2-19) 
 
                                                       
(2-20) 
 
Where RISKe is the estimated operational risk, which varies with time because the 
probability of failure is a function of time. The objective of this study is to obtain a risk-
based plant shutdown inspection and maintenance interval with an acceptable risk and to 
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determine the time at which the estimated risk is equal to the acceptable risk. Thus, Eq. 
(2-19) is subject to the following condition: 
                      (2-21) 
 
Acceptable risk is defined as the level of acceptance for shutdown inspection and 
maintenance planning purposes. For economic based consequence analysis, the acceptable 
risk is defined in terms of the financial limits. Each operating company defines its own 
tolerable risk criteria. This risk criterion should be used when making an estimation of risk-
based shutdown interval. 
2.4 The application of RBSIM to an onshore processing facility unit 
The above-proposed methodology has been used to develop shutdown maintenance 
and inspection intervals for a gas chilling/liquefaction unit in a LNG processing plant. The 
plant considered in this study employs the AP-X
TM
 Hybrid liquefaction process, licensed by 
Air Products and Chemicals Inc. (APCI). The AP-X
TM 
process cycle is an improvement on 
the C3MR process in that the LNG is sub-cooled using a simple, efficient nitrogen expander 
loop rather than a mixed refrigerant. A schematic process flow of this unit is shown in Figure 
2-5. 
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Figure 2-5: Process flow schematic of a gas chilling/liquefaction unit 
 
2.5 Results & discussions 
2.5.1 Module 1 
The main purpose of the gas chilling and liquefaction unit is to condense the natural 
gas into LNG in the main cryogenic heat exchanger (MCHE) and sub-cool it in the Sub-
cooling Heat Exchanger or the LNG Sub Cooler. The sweetened, dry and lean feed gas from 
the LNG recovery unit enters the Gas chilling and liquefaction unit and is chilled by 
vaporizing propane refrigerant in the exchangers (high, medium, low, and low-low pressure 
level), as shown in the block diagram. The propane vapors generated during chilling are 
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returned to the propane compressor via suction drums. After pre-cooling with propane 
refrigerant, the feed gas is liquefied in the MCHE, which uses a mixed refrigerant. It is then 
sub-cooled in the LNG Sub Cooler, which uses nitrogen as the refrigerant. The proposed risk 
matrix is applied to select the critical equipment from gas chilling and liquefaction unit 
(Table 2-1). A block diagram of the critical equipment selected for this unit is shown in 
Figure 2-6. It is evident that to perform any maintenance and inspections on any of these 
equipment, the unit (plant) must be placed in the shutdown mode. 
E01 E02 E03 E04 E05 E06
 
Figure 2-6: Block diagram of the critical equipment selected for a gas chilling/liquefaction 
unit 
 
Table 2-1: Critical equipment selected from gas chilling and liquefaction unit 
Chilling and Liquefaction Unit: 
Equipment No. Description 
E01 Feed Gas/HP C3 Exchanger 
E02 Feed Gas/MP C3 Exchanger 
E03 Feed Gas/LP C3 Exchanger 
E04 Feed Gas/LLP C3 Exchanger 
E05 Main Cryogenic Heat Exchanger 
E06 Sub Cooling Heat Exchanger/ LNG Sub Cooler 
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2.5.2 Module 2  
System failure probability is calculated using the block diagram shown in Figure 2-6. 
As the equipment in this unit operates in series, Eq. (2-5) is appropriate for this scenario. To 
calculate the system failure probability, the Weibull distribution parameters for the selected 
equipment are estimated using the method described in section 2.3.2.2. The estimated values 
are shown in Table 2-2. As no data for the MCHE and the LNG Sub Cooler is available in 
the history of operation for these components in OREDA, and considering that it has not 
failed and is highly reliable, a characteristic life and shape parameter is adopted based on 
expert judgment.  
Table 2-2: The failure rate data for the equipment considered in this case study 
Equipment No. Characteristic life (θ, h) Shape Parameter (β) 
E01 
282,000 4.38 
E02 
E03 
E04 
E05 
450,000 2.0 
E06 
 
Failure scenarios such as VCE for equipment E01 to E05 and VCE and Asphyxiation 
are considered for equipment E06 as listed in Table 2-3. These failure scenarios are subjected 
to consequence assessment. Given that the equipment described here involves the processing 
of hydrocarbons and operates at extreme conditions, the consequences of any failure will be 
very high. The last column in Table 2-3 shows the consequences of asset loss and human 
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health loss at the study point. This clearly shows that these consequences will have a major 
financial impact due to asset damages and human injuries or fatalities. Judycki (1994) of the 
US Department of Transportation and the Federal Highway Administration published a 
technical note relating the injury scale (in terms of severity) to the comprehensive costs in 
police-reported crashes. This note is used to calculate the financial impact on companies for 
human fatality or injuries.  
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Table 2-3: Failure scenarios and their estimated consequences 
Equipment 
No. 
Accident Scenario Accident Scenario Description Consequences of Asset 
Loss and Human 
Health Loss at study 
point (all values in 
million dollars) 
E01  
 
 
 
VCE (Vapor Cloud 
Explosion) 
 
 
Release of hydrocarbons from 
any of the equipment, which 
upon finding an ignition source 
may result in vapor cloud 
explosion, causing shock wave 
damaging assets and humans. 
344.98 
E02 307.29 
E03 256.40 
E04 88.34 
E05 284.18 
E06 VCE (Vapor Cloud 
Explosion) and 
Asphyxiation 
a) Release of hydrocarbons 
from the equipment, which 
upon finding an ignition 
source may result in vapor 
cloud explosion, causing shock 
waves damaging assets and 
humans. 
b) Release of N2 vapors, which 
upon physical contact may 
produce asphyxiation, 
resulting in human injuries or 
fatalities. 
377.76 
 
U.S. Energy Information Administration (2012) has published the LNG price in 
$/thousand cubic feet. The same is used in this study to calculate the economic consequences 
of production loss. 
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2.5.3 Module 3  
The estimated results of the consequences and failure probability of a unit are 
combined to quantify the operational risk. In general, the acceptable risk will be different 
from one company to another. An ALARP for this particular study is assumed to be $100/h. 
or lower. Any value higher than this is not acceptable. Given that the considered failure rate 
of the selected equipment is time dependent, the operational risk changes over the time 
period that the unit is in operation. A comparison of the estimated operational risk with the 
acceptable risk helps to determine the optimal shutdown inspection and maintenance 
intervals under the considered risk criteria. The optimized risk-based shutdown inspection 
and maintenance interval is found to be 23,663 h as shown in Figure 2-7. Estimated 
shutdown interval is considered to be an optimal solution under the assumed risk 
acceptability criteria. A conventional approach for inspection and maintenance interval based 
on the individual equipment does not consider the system unavailability resulting facility 
shutdown. Further, the consequences would be much higher with a conventional approach 
(based on individual equipment) as it does not consider, the overall facility shutdown, 
specifically production loss, leading to a higher risk. 
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Figure 2-7: Risk-based shutdown maintenance & inspection interval 
 
2.6 Summary and Conclusions 
In this study, a new framework for risk-based shutdown interval estimation for 
inspection and maintenance is proposed. The proposed methodology differs from the various 
maintenance scheduling methodologies available in the literature in that it considers the 
selection of equipment based on the actual risk to which a company may be exposed when 
selecting the shutdown interval of a unit or plant for maintenance and inspection. The 
methodology is composed of three main modules: (1) risk-based equipment selection for 
shutdown interval estimation, (2) estimation of failure data and failure consequences and (3) 
establishing the risk-based optimized shutdown interval. 
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This methodology helps to optimize shutdown intervals for the inspection and 
maintenance of a processing unit or plant while considering the exposed risk related to 
production, safety and environment. It minimizes the financial consequences for an operating 
company due to production loss, loss of assets, safety (e.g., injury or loss of life) and 
environmental consequences. 
The proposed methodology has been applied to obtain an optimum shutdown interval 
for a liquefied natural gas chilling and liquefaction unit, ensuring that the high level of risk is 
contained at an acceptable level. Such a shutdown interval optimization approach is expected 
to provide a cost-effective maintenance and inspection program and provide better asset and 
capital utilization. Estimated shutdown interval for maintenance and inspection are based on 
assumed ALARP criteria. As these criteria vary for different operating companies, the 
shutdown interval can be increased or decreased accordingly. The proposed RBSIM 
methodology can be easily applied to any processing facility, however, proper attention must 
be given to identify the most critical equipment which can be inspected or maintained only 
when the plant is in the non-operational (shutdown) state. A process plant consists of a large 
number of equipment and components which interact together under severe operating 
conditions such as high pressure, high and low temperatures and flow, thereby making the 
estimation of consequences an uphill task. A risk matrix must reflect a company's risk criteria 
as it will differ significantly from those of the other companies. It should ensure that 
appropriately experienced personnel from engineering, operations, SHE and the maintenance 
team ( with a good understanding of the system, failures, hazards, impact on operations and 
the consequences if the inspection and maintenance is delayed beyond a certain period) are 
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involved in performing risk assessment. Effective tools and methods should be utilized for 
the same. Other essential elements that govern the success of the methodology are:  
(1) An appropriate risk matrix that reflects organizational commitment,  
(2) Credible risk acceptance criteria developed considering the long term perspectives 
such as process safety and business interruption,  
(3) An effective data collection protocol to support risk assessment and evaluation of 
management strategies, and  
(4) Most importantly, safety culture. These non-technical elements require the 
unwavering commitment of the senior management.
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3 CHAPTER 3 
 
A risk-based methodology to estimate shutdown interval 
considering system availability
2
 
 
Abstract 
 This paper presents a risk-based methodology to estimate shutdown inspection and 
maintenance interval considering system availability. Most inspection and maintenance 
activities are performed when the plant/unit is in the operational state. However, some 
inspection and maintenance activities require the plant to be in a non-operational or 
shutdown state. In most cases, operating companies adopt a shutdown schedule based on the 
original equipment manufacturer’s (OEM) suggested recommended periods. However, this 
may not be the best strategy as OEM recommended duration is general and may not reflect 
the current state of operation. The proposed methodology is unique in the sense that it 
identifies a shutdown interval by identifying the critical equipment in terms of risk 
                                               
2 This Chapter is based on the published work in a peer-reviewed journal. Abdul Hameed, 
Faisal Khan, Salim Ahmed (2015), “A risk-based methodology to estimate shutdown interval 
considering system availability,” Process Safety Progress, Volume 34 (3), pages 267-279. To 
minimize the duplication, all the references are listed in the reference list. The contribution of the 
authors is presented in Section titled, “Co-authorship Statement”. 
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considering availability and safety of the operating unit. It optimizes process plant shutdown 
interval to minimize the risk (in dollar terms). The Markov process is used to establish the 
state diagram to calculate system availability. The proposed methodology is comprised of 
three steps namely, risk based equipment selection, shutdown availability modeling of a 
complex system using the Markov process and risk-based shutdown inspection and 
maintenance interval modeling. It can be applied to process plants such as those for LNG 
processing, petrochemicals and refineries. The key elements for the success of the proposed 
methodology are the plant specific data and identification of critical equipment. 
3.1 Introduction 
Inspection and maintenance have evolved from a nonissue into a strategic concern in 
a short span of time. Mourbray (1997) reported that over the last few decades, maintenance 
has changed more than any other management discipline. The changes are due to a huge 
increase in the number and the variety of physical assets (plant, equipment and buildings), 
more complex design, new maintenance techniques and changing views on maintenance 
organization and responsibilities.  
In general, a complex system consists of a large number of interacting components or 
equipment that performs the system’s required functions. The system is subject to 
periodically or non-periodically planned inspection and maintenance during its life cycle. 
The inspection and maintenance actions are generally taken to fix a piece of equipment if it is 
found defective and having the potential to fail or to perform preventive maintenance to 
avoid any possible failure. In certain cases, these equipment or system cannot be isolated to 
perform inspection and maintenance, and this requires the plant to be taken out of service, 
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which is known as shutdown or turnaround. Shutdowns are generally classified as sudden or 
emergency and non-emergency shutdowns as shown in Figure 3-1. The sudden or emergency 
shutdown is an unscheduled event which is initiated in the event of a failure or breach of 
containment (such as fire, major spill, instrument failure, power failure, or total loss of 
control of chemical or physical processes). Non-emergency shutdowns can be further 
classified as planned or unplanned shutdowns. According to Duffuaa & Daya (2004) and 
Lawrence (2012), a planned, periodic shut down (total or partial) of a processing unit or 
facility is carried out to perform maintenance, overhaul and repair operations and to inspect, 
test and replace process materials and equipment. Generally, planning for total shutdown 
begins well in advance and involves the departments of procurement, engineering, 
maintenance, operations, quality assurance, HSE, security, and administration. An unplanned 
shutdown is initiated when a possible failure scenario seems to exist but does not require 
immediate stoppage of the operation, and can be delayed for a few weeks. Both planned and 
unplanned shutdowns can be total or partial in nature. In extended shutdown a facility is put 
in a condition of preservation to prevent degradation over time for future usage. The focus of 
this article is on planned shutdown, both total and partial. 
Shutdown inspection and maintenance management is one of the maintenance 
management strategies used in continuously operating plants to improve plant reliability, 
availability and integrity. 
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Figure 3-1: Shutdown Classification 
 
Extensive literature is available on inspection and maintenance interval modeling 
considering cost, reliability, availability and risk. Inspection and maintenance intervals can 
be estimated on equipment by equipment basis. However, in a process plant, a unit or system 
consists of hundreds of pieces of equipment that run in continuous mode. Developing an 
inspection and maintenance strategy without considering the impact of these inspection and 
maintenance cycles over the operability of the plant will not produce an optimum interval. 
This problem could be solved by considering a risk-based critical component selection and 
by developing an optimized shutdown inspection and maintenance interval for the system. 
Risk, reliability and availability are interminably interlinked. Higher risk means lower 
reliability and availability, while higher availability means higher reliability and lower risk. 
In order to quantify the associated risk to the operating plant due to equipment or component 
failures, estimation of consequences is essential. Failure of a complex system results in not 
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only the loss of revenue due to production loss but also asset damages, safety and health 
issues and inspection and maintenance costs.  
Khan et al. (2008) have presented a risk-based methodology to estimate the optimal 
inspection and maintenance intervals which maximize a system’s availability by considering 
risk-based inspection and maintenance program to reduce the risk of failure and enhance the 
overall availability of the system. Sarkar and Behra (2012), Bertolini et al. (2009), Kumar 
and Chaturvedi (2008), Zhaoyang et al. (2011) and Wang et al. (2012) proposed that the risk-
based maintenance approach provided a mean to reduce the overall risk when selecting a 
maintenance strategy. Neil and Marquez (2012) considered a hybrid Bayesian network 
(HBN) framework to model the availability of renewable systems. In this approach, HBNs 
were used to model distributions for corrective repair time, logistics delay time and 
scheduled maintenance and combine these with time- to-failure distributions to derive system 
availability. Jacob and Amari (2005) explored the difficulties in determining reliability and 
availability for repairable and non-repairable systems. The analysis is difficult when the 
failure distribution is not exponential and becomes even more difficult when the systems are 
hybrid and complex rather than only series, parallel or a combination of the two. A binary 
decision diagram to calculate a system’s reliability and availability is presented (Jacob & 
Amari, 2005). Pil et al. (2008) proposed a concept of reliability assessment of re-liquefaction 
systems with focus on redundancy optimization and maintenance strategies based on a time 
dependent Markov approach. Penrose (2009) presented a tool for time to failure estimation 
for risk-based reporting of condition based maintenance tests and inspections to improve the 
effectiveness of the maintenance program by prioritizing corrective action. Khan and 
Haddara (2003) proposed a comprehensive and quantitative methodology for risk-based 
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maintenance. This methodology comprises of risk estimation module, risk evaluation 
module, and maintenance planning module by integrating reliability with safety and 
environmental issues and used as a decision tool for preventive maintenance planning. Risk-
based approach has been applied successfully to the maintenance of oil pipelines (Dey et al., 
1998), and Dey (2001). Krishnasamy et al., (2005) applied a risk-based maintenance strategy 
in developing cost-effective maintenance policies for critical equipment of a power-
generating plant by reducing the overall risk of the plant. Krishnasamy et al., (2005) reported 
that the profitability is closely related to the availability and reliability of the equipment. 
Alsyouf (2007) presented a model which enables the decision-makers to trace how an 
effective maintenance policy could influence the productivity and profitability through its 
direct impact on quality, efficiency and effectiveness of operation. Backlund and Hanu 
(2002) reported that risk analysis depends on various factors and therefore the focus must be 
put on the function required of the subsystem and equipment. Fujiyama et al. (2004) 
developed a risk-based maintenance system for steam turbine plants coupled with a quick 
inspection system. The objective was to provide a rational basis for life cycle maintenance 
planning. Duffua et al. (1999), Duffua and Daya (2004), Lenahan (1999) and Levitt (2004) 
covered only the management and execution portions of shutdown and have not addressed 
the important question regarding shutdown intervals to improve plant reliability and 
availability. Keshavarz et al. (2011) proposed a risk-based shutdown management strategy 
for liquefied natural gas (LNG) units. However, it did not address the equipment selection 
criteria for the shutdown interval. 
Thus, keeping in view the existing work, the objective of this article is to develop a 
risk-based methodology for a continuous processing facility to estimate shutdown interval for 
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optimal inspection and maintenance, considering complex system unavailability using the 
Markov model. This proposed methodology will provide a rational basis to make a shutdown 
interval inspection and maintenance decision considering the availability of the unit or plant 
and overall risk exposure. 
3.2 A risk-based Shutdown Interval Methodology (RBSIM) 
Although extensive work on inspection and maintenance interval estimation modeling 
is available in the literature, a very limited number of studies are there on shutdown 
inspection and maintenance modeling for a continuous operating facility. Authors such as 
Ghosh and Roy (2009), Rusin and Wojaczeck (2012), Vaurio (1995), Khan and Haddara 
(2003, 2004a, & 2004b), Krishnasamy et al. (2005), Tan and Kramer (1997), Duarte et al. 
(2006) and Vatn et al. (1996) have discussed methods to estimate the optimal maintenance 
and inspection interval considering cost, risk, availability and reliability. However, most of 
these studies are concerned with optimizing individual equipment inspection and 
maintenance cycles. The efforts towards finding an optimal inspection and maintenance 
interval is not considered in these studies, especially when it requires a unit or plant to be in 
nonoperational (shutdown) state from an operational state. This work has been carried out to 
bridge the existing gap in the literature and to provide a means to develop a methodology to 
estimate the shutdown inspection and maintenance interval for a continuous processing unit 
or plant rather than an inspection and maintenance interval for each piece of equipment. The 
proposed methodology to determine risk-based shutdown inspection and maintenance 
intervals is presented in the following sections. This framework is broken down into three 
main modules as shown in Figure 3-2: 
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(a) Module 1: Risk-based selection of critical equipment 
(b) Module II: Shutdown availability modeling using the Markov model  
(c) Module III: Risk-based shutdown interval estimation 
3.2.1 Module 1: Risk-based selection of critical equipment 
Duffua and Daya (2004) reported that during shutdown (turnaround), maintenance is 
performed on the equipment that cannot be performed unless the whole plant is taken out of 
service. In a typical operating plant where thousands of equipment and components are 
operating, it is very unlikely that a plant as a whole can be taken offline to perform inspection 
and maintenance based on individual equipment.  It will have severe financial consequences 
due to loss of production. A better approach will be to focus on the selection of equipment 
which cannot be inspected or repaired during the plant operation. This will help to reduce the 
frequent production losses due to shutdowns of the facility for each individual equipment 
inspection and maintenance. 
This module proposes a qualitative risk-based study for equipment selection with 
reference to the imposed risk on the facility and the performance of the equipment for taking 
the plant into shutdown mode. To achieve this, operating units or plants need to be divided 
into manageable systems to identify pertinent equipment or components. To minimize the 
exposed risk to the company, each unit needs to be analyzed to identify the equipment with 
the largest impact on the plant operability, reliability, availability, financial impact (e.g., 
revenue loss due to shutdown, asset damage due to failure, etc.), as well as the possible 
impact on safety and the environment. This cycle continues until the whole unit or plant is 
analyzed. The output from this qualitative risk assessment is a categorization of the equipm-  
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Figure 3-2: Risk-based shutdown interval methodology 
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-ment that exhibit a significant impact on the operability of unit or plant. API recommended 
practice API-580 (2009) provides the basic guidelines to develop a risk matrix. These 
guidelines have been used to establish the proposed risk-matrix as shown in Figure 3-3. 
According to API-580, (2009) for a qualitative risk analysis, the probability of failure (POF) 
may be categorized from one through five. However, it is appropriate to associate an event 
frequency with each probability category to provide guidance to determine the probability of 
failure as shown in Table 3-1. POF can be assessed separately for each unit, system, 
equipment grouping or individual equipment item. Similarly, consequences are represented 
in monetary terms ($) as shown in Table 3-2. 
Schon (1980) defined risk as a statement concerning the damage probability 
depending on both the frequency of occurrence and the extent of possible expected (either 
direct or indirect) damage to all kinds. The risk R, may be described by a suitable 
combination (×) of the frequency of occurrence of an undesirable event with the probable 
extent of the damage expected upon occurrence. Using the above definition, the risks 
associated with safety and health (       , production loss            asset loss (        
and environment        can be calculated. For the case of several competing consequences 
for equipment/components, the highest observed risk among the consequences should be 
considered. The outcome of this risk assessment will enable the selection of the most critical 
set of equipment that may result in functional failure of a unit or a system and will require to 
go for shutdown inspection and maintenance. Overall risk can be selected using Eq. (3-1): 
                                      (3-1) 
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Figure 3-3: Qualitative criticality risk ranking matrix 
 
Table 3-1: Five levels of probability of failure  
Possible qualitative rank Annual failure probability or 
frequency 
Frequent >0.1 
Probable 0.001 to 0.01 
Occasional 0.0001 to 0.001 
Remote 0.00001 to 0.0001 
Extremely Unlikely <0.000001 
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Table 3-2: Five level consequence table 
Possible qualitative rank Economic loss range 
Negligible EL<$10,000 
Minor $10,000<EL≤$100,000 
Moderate $100,000<EL≤$1,000,000 
Major $1,000,000<EL≤$10,000,000 
Catastrophic EL>$10,000,000 
 
3.2.2 Module II – Shutdown availability modeling using the Markov process 
In the life cycle of a plant, a component or a system, the duration for which it works 
can be defined as operational state with duration “d” until it undergoes into a fail or repair 
state. This leads to unavailability of the system which is generally referred to as unplanned 
shutdown. The component or system remains in the nonoperational state until a repair is 
completed with duration “r” and it starts delivering its intended function. This cycle of 
operation and shutdown continues throughout the lifetime of the component or system and 
can be represented as shown in Figure 3-4. An alternative approach is a planned cycle of 
inspection and maintenance of the systems, which cannot be inspected or maintained while in 
operation.  
Availability of a component or a system is one of the most important measures to 
analyze its performance. Since availability is a probability, the rule of probability theory may 
be applied to compute the system availability from the knowledge of component or system 
availability. Markov analysis looks at a system as being in one of several states. One possible 
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state, for example, is that in which all the components comprising the system are in 
operation. Another possible state is that in which one component has failed but the other 
components continue to work. A third possible scenario is that a component failure leads to 
system failure. Markov model can be extended to the repairable component or system 
assuming that both the failure rate and repair rate are constant (exponential distribution). A 
majority of the components or systems in a process facility can often be modeled using a two 
state Markov process. For example, the simplest case for determining the steady state 
availability is a single component system that has a failure rate (λ) and a repair rate (μ). 
Assume that the system will be in either one of the two possible states, Operational state (1) 
or Shutdown state (2) under repair or failed condition. This can be represented using a 
transition rate diagram as shown in Figure 3-5: 
 
Figure 3-4: Operational and shutdown state of a repairable system 
 
Operational State
(1)
Shutdown State
(2)
λ 
μ 
 
Figure 3-5: Markov state space diagram of a single component repairable system 
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Simple equipment is designed to perform few basic functions and is typically exposed 
to only one possible failure mode. However, a complex system performs multiple functions 
and consists of a number of items that can fail. Nowlan and Heap (1978) have reported that 
six different failure patterns exist as shown in Figure 3-6. NASA (2000) reported that random 
failures accounted for 77-92% of the total failures and age related failure characteristics 
accounted for the remaining 8-23% failures. Since 77-92% of the failures seem to follow 
constant failure rate, it is fair to assume the exponential distribution while modeling the 
availability of complex systems. 
 
Figure 3-6: Illustration of failure patterns (redrawn after Nowlan and Heap, 1978) 
 
Considering that 77-92% of the failures are random in nature (exponential 
distribution), Markov process can be extended to the complex system. Steady-state 
availability can be calculated using the Markov rate diagram. Steady state equations may be 
written for each state i on the basis of a general relationship as given in Eq. (3-2). 
 
 
Type E = 4% 
 
Type A = 2% 
Type F = 5% 
Type C = 7% 
 
Type D = 14% 
Time 
 
Type B = 68% 
F
ai
lu
re
 r
at
e 
 r
at
e 
   
65 
 
 
                                 
 
   
                             
(3-2) 
 
Letting Pi be the probability of being in state i and Pj in state j, the steady state 
equation can be written to calculate the availability or unavailability of the system. In 
general, the summation of all state probabilities remains equal to 1 as shown in Eq. (3-3). 
                (3-3) 
In the life cycle of a process plant, a system can be in the state of unplanned 
shutdown for repair due to the failure which has already happened or in a planned shutdown 
to perform the inspection and maintenance activities to improve the availability and 
reliability. The parameters of the distributions for unplanned shutdown can be estimated from 
failure data over the life cycle of the plant. If a planned shutdown is treated as a random 
event then the state space diagram for an unplanned shutdown and a planned shutdown can 
be modeled under two scenarios namely Case I and Case II.  
3.2.2.1 Case I 
Complex industries consist of multiple equipment configurations. These arrangements can be 
either full standby or active redundant. Full stand by and active redundant configurations 
provide contingency to the operation of the facility in case of any unforeseen failure and help 
to avoid the unplanned shutdown. In a standby system, the primary unit is in operation while 
the other units are in standby. If repair of the primary unit is feasible when it is in failed state, 
the system will continue to operate as long as the backup unit has not failed. If the primary 
unit is restored before the back-up unit fails, then from the operational perspective no 
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unplanned shutdown situation arises. Standby systems are generally much more reliable than 
the active redundant systems. In the case of a parallel or redundant system, system failure 
will only happen when all of the redundant systems have failed. If one or more of the units 
are operational, the system continues to operate. Generally, in a complex system, standby or 
redundancy features are designed to take 100% load of the production. If in both of these 
configurations, the primary failed equipment is not restored before the operating equipment 
fails, then the system will enter into an unplanned shutdown state. This situation is modeled 
as Case I and the corresponding state space diagram is shown in Figure 3-7. In Figure 3-7, λ 
and μ represents the transition rate for different system states.   
Applying the Markov method to the state space diagram, system availability can be 
calculated as follows: 
       (3-4) 
where 
         (3-5) 
where,    and    represents system in unplanned shutdown mode and in planned 
shutdown mode. 
For simplicity, it is assumed that µ1 = µ2 = µ3 = R, then the system availability (A) and 
unavailability (Q) can be defined as: 
   
    
               
 
  
         
 (3-6) 
Assuming that in an ideal case, failure rate is higher in the degraded as compared to 
the normal operation, Eq. (3-7) can be simplified as, 
               (3-7) 
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λ3 
 
Figure 3-7: State space diagram of an unplanned and planned shutdown for system 
with redundancy 
State System condition 
1 System in operation mode 
2 System in operation mode with back-up unit  
3 System in unplanned shutdown mode 
4 System in planned shutdown mode 
 
 
and thus, the expression for Q gets modified as:  
   
                          
                  
 (3-8) 
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3.2.2.2 Case II 
Another possible scenario is that the systems are designed with no redundancy or 
standby. In this situation a failure of any equipment or component will lead to unplanned 
shutdown.  Figure 3-8 shows the state space diagram for this type of a system configuration. 
1
2
3
μ2 
μ1 
λ1 
λ2 
 
Figure 3-8: State space diagram of an unplanned and planned shutdown for system  
with no redundancy 
State System condition 
1 System in operation mode 
2 System in unplanned shutdown mode 
3 System in planned shutdown mode 
 
  
Applying the Markov method to the state space diagram, system unavailability can be 
calculated as: 
         (3-9) 
    
    
              
   
    
              
  (3-10) 
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  (3-11) 
 
where Q is the system unavailability. The availability of the system can be calculated 
using Eq. (3-4). 
3.2.2.3 System Failure Rate 
A complex system may fail through various means resulting from different physical 
phenomena or different failure characteristics of individual components which may lead to an 
unplanned shutdown. A useful analysis approach in reliability engineering is to separate 
these failures according to the mechanism or components causing the failure. These 
categories of failures are then referred to as failure modes. Ebeling (1997) has defined that if 
λi (t) be the failure rate function for the ith failure mode then, assuming independence among 
the failure modes, the system failure rate is obtained as: 
                 
 
   
 (3-12) 
In case of a series-parallel combined system, the system failure rate can be calculated 
by breaking the network into series and parallel configurations. Mannan (2005) reported that 
if the failure rate of a component is constant, λ, then in the parallel configuration, the failure 
rate can be estimated using Eq. (3-13):  
 
    
 
  
 
   
 
   
 (3-13) 
 
Overall system failure rate for series-parallel configuration may be obtained by Eq. (3-14): 
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  (3-14) 
where, the term     
 
    represents the failure rate of the components acting in series 
and     
 
    represents the failure rate of the parallel configuration.. 
3.2.2.4 System Repair Rate 
System repair time is generally represented as the function of the repair times of the 
components. An average (mean) system repair time can be calculated by using the 
knowledge of the mean subsystem or component repair time. For a complex system 
comprising many subsystems or components, the mean time to repair depends on the repair 
time distribution of each of the subsystems or components such as electrical, hydraulic, 
mechanical and so on. Ebeling (1997) defined that the system mean time to repair (MTTR) 
may be computed as a weighted average of the subsystem MTTRs in which the weights are 
based on the relative number of failures and can be represented as: 
             
          
 
   
     
 
   
 (3-15) 
 
where MTTRi is the mean time to repair the ith unique subsystem, fi is the expected 
number of failures of the ith unique subsystem over the system design life, and qi is the 
number of identical subsystems of type i.  
 
3.2.3 Module III – Risk-Based Shutdown Interval Estimation 
Muhlbauer (2004) presented the most commonly accepted definition of risk, often 
expressed mathematically as: 
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                                          , 
(3-16) 
 
However, in this paper, risk is defined as the POF of a system or component to 
deliver its intended function in a given time-frame under a given operating context and the 
overall consequences in monetary ($) values. The two components of the risk can be 
quantitatively expressed as: 
 
      
                                               , 
(3-17) 
 
Since the risk is a combination of probability and the consequence, one needs to 
consider all possible consequences, including safety and health, operational and non-
operational consequences. Estimation of failure probability and the consequences are 
discussed below.   
3.2.3.1 Estimation of System Failure Probability 
In general, operating companies keenly focus on targeting to maintain the desired 
availability to achieve their operational goal.  Considering the process plant targeted 
availability, and using this as a constraint in the Markov model (as discussed in Case I and 
II), system failure rate can be estimated. This planned failure rate will help to achieve the 
required availability of the unit or plant and minimize the overall exposure of the risk to 
operating companies. Since the system failure probability is a function of failure rate and is 
complementary to the reliability of the system, mathematically it can be written as: 
                            
(3-18) 
 
where t is the failure time of the system on or before a time      
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3.2.3.2 Estimation of the Economic Consequences of Shutdown 
Generally, process plants run under extreme operating conditions such as high 
pressures and temperatures. Improper inspection and maintenance of processing equipment 
may result in damage to the casing, ring, impeller, and mechanical seal of rotating 
equipment. These in turn can lead to failure modes which can have a severe impact on the 
safety and health of the people. For example, a catastrophic failure of a pump bearing 
operating in a gas processing plant or refinery may release hydrocarbons, which may form a 
vapor cloud and result in an explosion in the presence of an ignition source. The 
consequences of a failure are not only localized to mechanical damage of the equipment 
itself; it can cause significant damages to nearby assets, as well as result in operational loss, 
serious safety and health issues, adverse environmental impact and inspection and 
maintenance cost. These consequences can be calculated based on the effects of thermal 
radiation and overpressure on surrounding equipment and personnel and subsequently 
converted in monetary ($) terms. Each of these economic consequences is discussed briefly 
in the following section.  
3.2.3.2.1 Economic Consequence of Asset Loss (ECAL) 
A failure of processing equipment may lead to various hazards resulting from the 
release of materials and energy. For example, a hydrocarbon release may result in flash fires, 
jet fires, pool fires, BLEVE, fire balls, VCE or toxic dispersion in a process plant. 
Consequence effect zones (m
2
) for such hazards can be calculated in terms of overpressure to 
establish asset losses. The assessment of the consequence effect zones and their impact 
involves many models. These include source models, dispersion models, fire models and 
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explosion models. A large number of computer software packages are available to perform 
these types of analyses. The main parameters required to perform these calculations are 
operating pressure, temperature, physical and chemical properties, and atmospheric 
conditions. In cases of flash fire, jet fire, pool fire and BLEVE, asset damage due to heat flux 
can be calculated and converted into POF of various damage effects using the probit analysis 
((Assael & Kakosimos, 2010), & (Crowl & Louvar, 2002)). Asset damage can be estimated 
for each accident scenario using the following equation: 
                      
(3-19) 
 
where, i represents the various possible scenarios,      is the probability of damage 
due to heatflux in the effected zones and    is the asset density.  
In the case of explosion, asset damage due to overpressure can be calculated and 
converted into POF due to overpressure using the probit analysis ((Assael & Kakosimos, 
2010), & (Crowl & Louvar, 2002)). Asset damage can be estimated for this scenario using 
the following equation: 
                 (3-20) 
 
where      is the probability of damage due to overpressure,    is the effected zone 
due to overpressure and    is asset density.  
3.2.3.2.2 Economic Consequence of Human Health Loss (ECHHL) 
In cases of flash fire, jet fire, pool fire and BLEVE, probability of injury or death due 
to fire effects can be calculated for a given heat flux at a specified effected zone and which 
can be converted into probability of injury or death using the probit analysis ((Assael & 
   
74 
 
Kakosimos, 2010), & (Crowl & Louvar, 2002)). ECHHL can be estimated for each accident 
scenario using the following equation: 
                            
(3-21) 
 
where, i represents the various possible scenarios,      is the probability of injury or 
death due to heatflux in the effected zones ,    is the population density and    is the cost of 
injury or fatality.  
In the case of explosion, human health losses such as injuries and fatalities due to 
overpressure can be calculated and converted into probability of damage due to overpressure 
using the probit analysis ((Assael & Kakosimos, 2010), & (Crowl & Louvar, 2002)). 
Economic consequence of human health loss can be estimated for each accident scenario 
using the following equation: 
                      (3-22) 
 
where,      is the probability of damage due to overpressure,    is the effected 
zone due to overpressure,    is population density and    is cost of injury or fatality. 
The loss of life or pain suffered due to equipment failure is difficult to calculate in 
monetary value. However, the cost due to compensation and corporate liability needs be 
taken into account in terms of economic consequences, which vary for operating companies. 
Judycki (1994) of the US Department of Transportation and the Federal Highway 
Administration published a technical note relating the injury scale (in terms of severity) to 
the comprehensive costs in police-reported crashes. The figures of this study are used herein 
to calculate financial impact on companies for human fatality or injuries. 
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3.2.3.2.3 Production Loss 
One of the most important operational consequences is the production loss due to 
unavailability of the asset to perform its function. Production loss due to plant being taken 
into a planned shutdown is one of the major negative financial impacts on the operating 
companies. The loss due to the non-production of the desired product is directly linked to the 
inspection and maintenance duration and frequency over the life of the asset. Production loss 
is the function of the number of unit loss, selling price/unit and the amount of duration the 
system is out for inspection and service. In general, the reported MTTR does not cover all the 
factors which contribute in getting the actual repair duration. To overcome this shortfall and 
to have a better estimation of the production loss, in this paper a Mean Shutdown Time 
(MSDT) is proposed over the design life of the system or unit considering that the shutdown is 
a planned event in advance and the factors related to material supply delay and any 
uncertainty in supply are negligible.  
It can be defined as: 
             
            
  
   
     
       
  
   
 (3-23) 
where, 
 
MTTR is the mean time to repair, td is design life of the plant or unit, TSD is shutdown 
interval and MSDT is Shutdown duration considering preparation, inspection and 
maintenance actions.  
In the case of exponential distribution, m is replaced with λsys. 
Hence, the operational consequence due to production loss can be represented 
mathematically as: 
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 EC                         
(3-24) 
 
where,             denotes the mean shutdown maintenance time in days, PL is production 
loss volume per day and SP is the selling price of the product per unit volume. 
3.2.3.2.4 Inspection and Maintenance Cost 
Planned inspection and maintenance cost can be classified as a nonoperational 
consequence. This cost includes the cost of preparation (scaffolding, insulation removal, 
blinding, purging), cost of inspection (visual inspection, hydro jetting, eddy current testing, 
etc.,) and the cost of maintenance activities and materials (spare parts, maintenance materials, 
tools and vehicles associated with maintenance or inspection jobs), and the cost of technical 
support. These costs can be calculated using the following equations: 
             
(3-25) 
                      
(3-26) 
 
 
                
(3-27) 
               
(3-28) 
                     
(3-29) 
  
Where, Cp is the preparatory cost, Clp is the cost of preparatory maintenance labor per 
hour ($/Hr.), tp is the duration of the preparatory work, Ci is the inspection cost, Cli is the cost 
of skilled inspection labor per hour ($/Hr.), Cie is cost of inspection equipment per hour 
($/Hr.), ti is the duration of inspection work, Cm is the maintenance cost, Clm is the cost of 
skilled maintenance labor per hour ($/Hr.), Csp is the cost of spare parts consumed, tm is the 
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duration of maintenance work, Cts is the technical support cost, Clts is the cost of a technical 
support specialist per hour ($/Hr.) and t is the duration of technical support work in hours. 
The total economic consequences of shutdown are the following: 
                              
 
        , 
(3-30) 
where, i = 1, 2, 3………n is the equipment identified from the criticality matrix and 
considered for shutdown interval estimation. 
A risk-based approach not only helps to make an optimized decision to bring a process 
plant or unit in a shutdown mode for inspection and maintenance but also assists in 
determining an optimized shutdown inspection and maintenance interval. The concept of 
risk-based inspection and maintenance optimization is generally accepted and applied in 
petrochemical and process industries. However, it has not been used to optimize the 
shutdown inspection and maintenance interval. 
3.3 The Application of RBSIM to a LNG Processing Facility 
Alabdulkarem et al. (2011) have reported that LNG plants are increasing in number 
due to the growing demand for natural gas (NG). NG is the cleanest of the fossil fuels. LNG 
is produced by the liquefaction of NG from the atmospheric temperature to -160 
o
C. 
Different NG liquefaction cycles exist that use either pure refrigerant in cascade cycles, 
multi-pressure cycles, or mixed refrigerant (MR) cycles. Mokhateb and Economides (2006) 
reported that the Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. (APCI) licensed Propane Precooled MR 
process has dominated the market since 1970 and accounts for a significant proportion of the 
world's base load LNG production capacity.  
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Alabdulkarem et al. (2011) reported that about 77% of LNG plants are using the 
propane pre-cooled MultiComponent Refrigerant cycle licensed by APCI for NG 
liquefaction. Roberts et al. (2002) reported that in response to continuing producer demand 
for increased LNG train capacity, APCI has developed the AP-X
TM
 LNG Process. The AP-
X
TM
 process is a hybrid of a C3-MR cycle for precooling and liquefying LNG and a nitrogen 
gas compressor-expander cycle for subcooling LNG. In the AP-X™ process, the warmer 
LNG is subcooled to storage temperature by a gaseous nitrogen refrigerant in the same 
compression/expansion cycle that has been used for years to liquefy oxygen, nitrogen, and 
for peak-shaver NG liquefiers. Similar to the traditional C3MR process, propane is used to 
provide cooling to a temperature of approximately -30 °C. The feed is then cooled and 
liquefied by MR, exiting the Main Cryogenic Heat Exchanger (MCHE) at a temperature of 
approximately -120 °C. Final subcooling of the LNG is performed using cold gaseous 
nitrogen from the nitrogen expander. The proposed methodology is applied to a LNG facility. 
Figure 3-9 shows a general equipment layout for the liquefaction and subcooling sections of 
an AP-X™ LNG train. Coil wound heat exchangers are used to liquefy and subcool the LNG, 
while the nitrogen economizer uses brazed aluminum plate fin heat exchangers. 
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Figure 3-9: Air Products AP-X™ process (redrawn after Roberts et al. 2002) 
 
The described methodology can be extended to other production processes as well. 
However, the risk matrix should be re-evaluated accordingly for equipment selection. 
3.3.1 Module I: Risk-based Selection of Critical Equipment 
In this application, the methodology discussed earlier is applied to a section of the 
refrigeration unit of one of the LNG liquefaction processing plants. The main purpose of the 
refrigeration unit in a liquefaction processing plant is to supply various refrigerants to 
condense the NG into LNG. As a by-product, the exhaust gas from the gas turbine is routed 
through a heat recovery system where high pressure steam is produced. The refrigeration unit 
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is composed of three major systems viz., the propane refrigeration system, the MR system 
and the nitrogen refrigeration system. The propane system primarily provides chilling for the 
feed circuit and the MR system. The MR system provides low temperature refrigeration to 
produce LNG in the MCHE. Finally the nitrogen system subcools the LNG in the Sub-
cooling Heat Exchanger. The propane refrigeration system consists of propane compression, 
water-cooled condensers and subcoolers. The heart of the system is a gas turbine with a 
starter, helper and/or generator which drives the compressors. The MR comprises a mixture 
of hydrocarbon (methane, ethane and propane) and nitrogen. The system is composed of a 
numbers (varies design-wise) of compressors, turbine, water cooled and propane cooled heat 
exchangers, suction drums and separators. The nitrogen refrigeration system consists of 
compressor, water-cooled inter-coolers and exchangers. Equipment criticality analysis helps 
to evaluate how failures of these equipment impact the performance of assets and is used to 
prioritize equipment selection for inspection and maintenance. Module I of the presented 
methodology describes the critical equipment selection using the risk matrix. The proposed 
risk assessment not only helps to evaluate and select the critical equipment for shutdown 
inspection and maintenance availability modeling (by considering its influence on the plant 
or unit) but also to determine the risk associated if the inspection and maintenance interval 
cycle is delayed beyond the manageable duration. Equipment categorization using this 
methodology helps to identify the critical equipment and their interaction for unit or plant 
availability. The outcome of this qualitative risk evaluation is the classification of the 
equipment with a risk prioritization number. For example, if an equipment is identified 
having as high probability (frequent = 5) and higher production loss (extreme= 5), the risk 
number is 25. Similarly the other risk factors can be estimated. In the case of multiple risk 
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numbers, the higher risk number is considered for the equipment. This process is continued 
until all of the equipment in the unit is evaluated. In case, if the POF is low but has a higher 
consequence impact on HSE, the equipment is selected as critical. The selected critical 
equipment is used to develop the functional block diagram to model the shutdown 
availability. The block diagram helps to select the best Markov model for system availability 
estimation. A total of 12 equipment are identified to be critical for the considered unit which 
can have a severe financial impact on the operability of the unit. These equipment are listed 
in Table 3-3. The block diagram is shown in Figure 3-10, which is based on the selected 
equipment.  
Table 3-3: Critical selected equipment for MR unit 
Tag Equipment description 
MR1 Accumulator 
LSD1 Suction Drum 
LC1 Compressor 
LPA1 Compressor After-cooler 
MSD1 Suction Drum 
MC1 Compressor 
MPA1 Compressor After-cooler 
HSD1 Suction Drum 
HC1 Compressor 
HPA1 Compressor After-cooler 
GT1 Gas Turbine 
HM1 Starter/Helper/Generator Motor 
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MR1 LSD1 LC1 LPA1 MSD1 MC1
MPA1 HSD1 HC1 HPA1 GT1 HM1
 
Figure 3-10: Block diagram of critical selected equipment for MR unit 
 
3.3.2 Module II: System Availability Modeling using Markov Process 
The developed block diagram in Module I will help to select the Markov model to 
estimate the planned system failure rate for inspection and maintenance under the considered 
availability constraint. It is evident from the block diagram that a failure of any of the 
selected equipment will lead to complete system failure which will produce an undesired 
shutdown of the plant. Thus, any inspection and maintenance plan should consider these 
critical equipment to perform a risk-based shutdown inspection and maintenance interval. In 
order to estimate the planned shutdown failure rate considering the required unit availability, 
failure rate and repair rate data are of primary importance.  Failure and repair rates of a 
system are primarily determined using plant historical data, test data, data banks, and/or from 
the operating experience of plant personnel using expert judgment. In case if failure specific 
data are not available, theoretical approaches published by Cizelj et al. (2001) can also be 
used.  For this study, failure and repair data for the selected critical equipment are either 
adopted from the OREDA (2002) or help has been sought from qualified plant personnel 
based on their technical judgment for repair data. Table 3-4 shows the failure rate and repair 
rate data considered for this study. Eq. (3-8) and Eq. (3-11) of the proposed Markov model 
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discussed in Module II are used to estimate the system planned shutdown failure rate which 
will help to achieve the desired availability target. The estimated value is shown in Table 3-5. 
Table 3-4: Critical selected equipment failure and repair data 
Equipment description Failure rate (λ) Repair rate (μ) 
Accumulator 1.141Х10-6 0.0208 
Suction Drum 1.141Х10-6 0.0208 
Compressor 2.314Х10-6 0.0027 
Compressor After-cooler 1.141Х10-6 0.0208 
Gas Turbine 2.283Х10-5 0.0208 
Starter/Helper/Generator Motor 3.805Х10-6 0.0138 
 
Table 3-5: Estimated system failure and repair rates  
Availability Constraints 0.98  
Estimated system failure rate 4.157X10
-5
 Using Eq. (3-12) 
Estimated system repair rate 0.0097 Using Eq. (3-13) 
Estimated planned shutdown failure rate 0.00016 Using Eq. (3-9) 
3.3.3 Module III: Risk-Based Shutdown Interval 
Module III of the proposed methodology consists of three parts viz. estimating system 
failure probability, all possible consequences due to process unit shutdown, and finally 
developing a risk profile to find the optimal shutdown inspection and maintenance interval. A 
system failure probability is a function of time and failure rate, which can be modeled using 
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exponential, Weibull, normal or lognormal distribution. In order to apply Markov availability 
model system failure probability is calculated using the exponential distribution as discussed 
in Module II. The estimated value of exponential distribution parameter is shown in Table 
3-5. Thus, the system failure probability function can be written using Eq. (3-17) as follows: 
                          
(3-31) 
 
Given the fact that the equipment described here involves the processing of 
hydrocarbons and operates at extreme conditions, the consequences of any failure will be 
very high. The failure scenario considered for estimating the asset loss and human health loss 
for these equipment is the release of hydrocarbons, which upon finding an ignition source 
may result in explosion that could generates shock waves. These shock waves may cause 
serious asset damage as well as human injuries or fatality. Calculated shock waves are then 
transformed into probability of damage due to shock waves for various effected zones. In this 
particular scenario, estimated consequence is based on a radius of 200m. It is important to 
note that the loss of life or injury suffered by the people is hard to estimate in monetary 
value. However, the cost associated with the compensation and corporate liability needs to be 
taken into account in consequence analysis. In this regard, a published note from Judycki 
(1994) of the US Department of Transportation and the Federal Highway Administration 
relating the injury scale (in terms of severity) to the comprehensive costs in police-reported 
crashes is used. Production loss is estimated using Eq. (3-23), and an average of 10 days is 
considered for MSDT. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (2012) published the 
LNG price in $/thousand cubic feet. The same is used in this study to calculate the economic 
consequences of production loss. The total calculated consequence along with Eq. (3-29) is 
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used to generate the expected risk profile to determine the optimal inspection and 
maintenance intervals. Figure 3-11, shows the obtained risk profile to achieve the optimal 
planned shutdown inspection and maintenance interval. This risk profile will enable the 
achievement of a desired level of availability (98%) for the system considered while meeting 
the risk exposure to the lowest level. The lowest risk point will give an optimum shutdown 
interval; in this case it is estimated to be 13000 h. It is evident that by performing a risk-
based planned shutdown inspection and maintenance interval, the risk will be significantly 
reduced. As the shutdown interval beyond this period (the time at which the system needs to 
be down for inspection and maintenance) increases, the risk starts to increase as shown in 
Figure 3-11. Risk profile obtained is a function of system failure, and system configuration 
coupled with exposed consequences to the operation due to unavailability of the facility. 
Hence, depending upon the company risk tolerance, estimated shutdown interval for the 
considered unit can be further increased. A sensitivity analysis is performed to study the 
effect of the availability constraint and mean shutdown inspection and maintenance duration 
on the shutdown interval model. The results are plotted in Figure 3-12 and Figure 3-13. It is 
evident from Figure 3-12 that the estimated shutdown inspection and maintenance interval is 
sensitive to the overall system availability considered. For 95% system availability, the 
estimated interval is close to 19000 h. for 97% system availability the estimated interval is 
close to 16000 h., and for 98% system availability the estimated interval is close to 13000 h. 
No significant impact is observed for the mean shutdown time duration over the shutdown 
inspection and maintenance interval. Based on risk-based shutdown interval estimation, for 
the design life of 25 years, a total of 17 shutdowns are recommended. This is the optimal 
number of shutdown over the design life. However, if an inspection and maintenance strategy 
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is selected based on individual equipment basis, it will be suboptimal and will have higher 
financial risk (as evident in Figure 3-12). 
 
Figure 3-11: Risk-based shutdown inspection and maintenance interval modeling 
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Figure 3-12: Risk-based shutdown inspection and maintenance interval – Sensitivity 
analysis for availability 
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Figure 3-13: Risk-based shutdown inspection and maintenance interval - Sensitivity analysis 
for MSDT 
 
3.4 Discussion and Conclusions  
Over the last few decades risk-based inspection and maintenance optimization has 
been accepted and applied in petrochemical and process industries. However, in most cases it 
has been applied to optimize the inspection and maintenance interval on equipment basis. In 
addition, there is lack of system’s approach to estimating risk-based shutdown inspection and 
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reduce the exposure of risk to the operating company and shareholders. This methodology 
ensures that the unit or plant is not only available for production but also the overall risk 
exposure is reduced to an acceptable level. Estimated risk-based shutdown inspection and 
maintenance interval will not only enhance the reliability and availability but also the safety 
and operation of the facility. The methodology provides a tool to determine shutdown 
inspection and maintenance intervals for unit or systems based on the optimization of the 
total risk in order to bring the operating plant in a planned shutdown mode. The presented 
methodology consists of three main modules: (1) Risk-based critical equipment selection, (2) 
Shutdown availability modeling using Markov process, and (3) Risk-based shutdown interval 
estimation. The proposed methodology minimizes the financial consequences for an 
operating company due to production loss, loss of assets, safety (e.g., injury or loss of life).  
In the present study, the proposed methodology is applied to the MR section of a 
LNG refrigeration unit, ensuring that the high level of risk is contained at an acceptable level. 
The developed risk-matrix is used to select the critical equipment that cannot be inspected or 
maintained without the unit or plant being taken into shutdown. Applying the Markov 
process, an availability constraint of 98% is used to estimate the planned shutdown rate. 
Estimated planned shutdown failure rate along with the consequences of failures are used to 
generate the risk profile as shown in Figure 3-11. Risk-based shutdown interval optimization 
approach is expected to provide a cost-effective maintenance and inspection program and 
provide better asset and capital utilization. All processing plants such as LNG processing 
facilities, petrochemicals and refineries, which consist of similar equipment like heat 
exchangers, vessels, columns, compressors, pumps, turbines, valves, detectors, transmitters 
and others can benefit immensely from this approach. The functionality of these equipment 
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remains the same, except that their operating parameters can vary. Moreover, since the 
shutdown availability modeling is only dependent upon the failure rate and the repair rate and 
other assumptions do not play a significant role, the presented methodology can be extended 
to any processing or manufacturing facility. However due care should be exercised when 
defining the risk-matrix for selecting critical equipment which requires the unit or plant to be 
taken in shutdown in order to perform any inspection and maintenance.
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4 Chapter 4 
 
A risk-based shutdown inspection and maintenance interval 
considering human error for a processing facility
 3
 
Abstract 
This paper presents a risk-based methodology to estimate shutdown inspection and 
maintenance interval by integrating human errors with degradation modeling of a processing 
unit. The methodology presented in this paper addresses to identify number of shutdown 
intervals required to achieve a target reliability over a goal period. The proposed 
methodology is the extension of the previously published work by the authors to determine 
the shutdown interval considering the system desired availability. The proposed work is 
novel in the sense that a concept of human error during shutdown inspection and 
maintenance is introduced while modeling the system failure. Selection of critical equipment 
is the most important aspect in obtaining the shutdown interval to minimize overall 
operational risk. In order to achieve this; a risk criticality matrix is proposed to select the 
                                               
3
 This Chapter is based on the published work in a peer-reviewed journal. Abdul Hameed, 
Faisal Khan, Salim Ahmed (2016), “A Risk-based Shutdown Inspection and Maintenance Interval 
considering human error for a processing facility,” Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 
Volume 100, pages 9-21. To minimize the duplication, all the references are listed in the reference 
list. The contribution of the authors is presented in Section titled, “Co-authorship Statement”. 
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critical equipment for shutdown inspection and maintenance. Probability of human error 
induced during shutdown inspection and maintenance is estimated using Success Likelihood 
methodology (SLIM). The proposed methodology is comprised of three steps namely, 
equipment selection considering criticality of operation, system failure modeling considering 
human error and finally a risk-based shutdown inspection and maintenance interval 
estimation. The proposed methodology is applied to a gas chilling and liquefaction unit of a 
hydrocarbon processing facility. The methodology is used to ensure the practicality of the 
proposed formulation to the real industry. The proposed methodology can be applied to any 
plant (process or non-process) such as those for LNG processing, petrochemicals, refineries 
or manufacturing plants. The key elements for the success of the proposed methodology are 
the identification and selection of critical equipment, breakdown of activities to estimate 
human error probability (HEP) and plant specific data for modeling system failures. 
4.1 Introduction 
Due to continuous production demands, processing facilities are getting not only bigger 
and bigger but also more complex in nature. The increase in complexity and size is inviting 
maintenance and reliability engineers to put more emphasis on system inspection and 
maintenance optimization to minimize unplanned downtime, overall cost and risk exposure. 
Effective inspection and maintenance is one of the critical elements for operating facilities. 
The core objective of inspection and maintenance is to make sure that the facilities or 
equipment are optimized in a way, which does not only increase the reliability and 
availability of the plant but also minimizes the overall operational risk. Inspection and 
maintenance on some of the equipment are performed by taking the unit or facility out of the 
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service, generally termed as Shutdown. Taking the unit or facility out of the service, 
generally termed as shutdown, performs inspection and maintenance on some of the 
equipment. Duffua and Daya (2004) and Lawrence (2012) have stated that a planned periodic 
shut down is carried out to perform maintenance and to inspect, test and replace process 
materials and equipment. Inspection and maintenance strategies of the equipment, which do 
not require facility to be taken in shutdown mode, can be developed based on individual 
equipment. Shutdown interval is one of the most important factor in determining an effective 
inspection and maintenance policy. In case if the shutdown inspection and maintenance 
interval is too short, facility shutdown time and production loss along with the inspection and 
maintenance cost will be too high, vice versa if the shutdown interval is too long, the 
production loss and inspection and maintenance cost will be low but the risk exposure will be 
high. This leads to find an optimal solution for shutdown inspection and maintenance 
interval. Failure of equipment may lead to significant consequences due to improper 
planning. Understanding the facilities system from operation and safety is the most important 
faucet when selecting and designing a shutdown inspection and maintenance model. A 
typical processing facility consists of hundreds of equipment, which works, in rigorous 
environment. One of the key aspects which should be covered and included when modeling 
for shutdown inspection and maintenance optimization, is to include human error and its 
impact on the equipment or system failure. Integration and design of the systems such as 
acting in series, parallel, combination of series-parallel, 50% load capacity or 100% load 
capacity dictate the development of shutdown inspection and maintenance strategy for the 
processing plant. Inspection and maintenance operation is one of the key links in the process 
chain for achieving the required production and management goals. While performing 
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inspection and maintenance, a minor failure and omission in following a clear guideline or 
process not only minimizes all of the inspection and maintenance benefits but also increases 
and changes the failure rate or behavior of the equipment or system due to introduction of 
human error. Despite technological advancement in equipment design and consideration 
given for maintainability, man-machine interface cannot be eliminated. In general, any 
inspection and maintenance process involves disassembly; reassembly and/or replacement of 
components. These processes require human interaction, and under various circumstances, 
create potential to include human error by installing or replacing a wrong part or assembling 
the part in wrong sequence despite all technological enhancement. In this paper, the focus is 
on the group of equipment which cannot be inspected or maintained and requires a shutdown 
of the facility. Thus, in order to develop an optimal inspection and maintenance strategy, 
attention must be paid while selecting these critical equipment. 
4.2 Past Studies 
Inspection and maintenance optimization has gained huge momentum and dynamic 
changes over the last couple of decades due to the realization of potential benefits in plant 
availability, reliability, scheduling, cost and risk minimization. Risk, reliability and 
availability are the three facet of facility operation and are interminably linked together. A 
high risk is generally an indication of facility lower reliability and availability, while higher 
availability means higher reliability and lower risk. Operation risk is associated with the 
probability of equipment or component failure and the consequences of failure such as loss of 
revenue due to production loss, asset damages, safety and health issues and inspection and 
maintenance costs. Obiajunwa (2012) reported that typically power plant turnaround 
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maintenance is planned for every four years, oil refinery and petrochemical plant shutdown 
maintenance is planned for every two years, and chemical, steel, glass and food and beverage 
plant shutdown maintenance is planned for every year. Alsyouf (2007) presented a model 
enabling the decision-makers to identify how an effective maintenance policy could 
influence the productivity and profitability through its direct impact on quality, efficiency 
and effectiveness of operation. Backlund and Hanu (2002) reported that while doing the risk 
analysis focus must be put on the function required of the subsystem and equipment. 
Fujiyama et al. (2004) proposed a risk-based maintenance system for steam turbine plants 
which is coupled with an inspection system. Ghosh and Roy (2009), Rusin and Wojaczeck 
(2012), Vaurio (1995), Khan and Haddara (2003, 2004a,b), Krishnasamy et al. (2005), Tan 
and Kramer (1997), Duarte et al. (2006) and Vatn et al. (1996) have presented methods to 
estimate the optimal maintenance and inspection interval considering cost, risk, availability 
and reliability for individual equipment and have not considered the impact of facility 
shutdown. Neil and Marquez (2012) proposed a hybrid Bayesian network (HBN) framework 
to model the availability of renewable systems considering corrective repair time, logistics 
delay time and scheduled maintenance. These were combined with time- to-failure 
distributions using HBN. Mannan and Yang (2010) proposed a dynamic risk assessment 
(DORA) methodology considering various process variables such as level, flow rate, 
temperature, pressure and chemical concentration and their impact to guide and improve the 
process design and optimize failure probability. However, the proposed methodology is not 
considering whether a sequence of component failure will lead to the system failure. The 
uniqueness of the presented methodology is that it helps to optimize the shutdown inspection 
and maintenance interval to minimize the overall system failure which will lead to reduce the 
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un-necessary shutdown. Jacob and Amari (2005) presented a binary decision diagram to 
calculate system reliability and availability. Pil et al. (2008) proposed a redundancy 
optimization and maintenance strategies based on a time dependent Markov approach. Khan 
and Haddara (2003) proposed a comprehensive and quantitative methodology for risk-based 
maintenance. Dey et al. (1998) and Dey (2001) have applied risk-based approach to the 
maintenance of oil pipelines. Khan et al. (2008) have presented a risk-based methodology to 
maximize a system’s availability by considering risk-based inspection and maintenance 
program to reduce the risk of failure and enhance the overall availability of the system. 
Sarkar and Behra (2012), Bertolini et al. (2009), Kumar and Chaturvedi (2008), Zhaoyang et 
al. (2011) and Wang et al. (2012) proposed that selecting a maintenance strategy based on 
risk reduces the overall risk. However, most of these studies are concerned with optimizing 
equipment inspection and maintenance cycles based on perfect (AGAN) as good as new or 
minimal (ABAO) as bad as old repair. AGAN strategy holds the assumption that after the 
maintenance intervention, the system starts its life under the same failure rate as if it were 
new. On the other hand ABAO holds that the equipment or system is maintained with minor 
action, which has not changed the failure rate behavior and after the maintenance activity the 
failure rate remains the same as it was before the maintenance. In order to overcoming the 
short fall of AGAN or ABAO strategy, researchers have introduced concept of imperfect 
maintenance. Nguyen and Murthy (1981) introduced the concept of imperfect maintenance 
considering that the failure characteristic of the system is different (worse) from that of 
correctively maintained system to minimize the mean cost rate. Block et al. (1985) extended 
Brown and Proschan model and proposed an age dependent repairable model considering a 
probability of p(t) a complete repair or with probability q(t)=1-p(t) is a minimal repair, 
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where, t is the age of the equipment in use at the failure time. Ben-Daya and Alghamdi 
(2000) presented two sequential preventive maintenance model considering age reduction 
model, an extension of Nakagawa’s model while in the second model PM, intervals are 
defined such that the integrated hazard rate over each interval is the same for all intervals. 
Levitin and Lisnianski (1999) have used Genetic Algorithm to generalize a preventive 
maintenance optimization to multi-state system considering the effective age of equipment. 
Nakagawa et al. (2012) considered system damages (damage level k) due to shock (shock 
number N) and proposed a preventive model considering imperfect maintenance. Rangan and 
Grace (1989) extended Brown and Proschan model to develop a replacement policy for a 
deteriorating system with imperfect maintenance. Li and Shaked (2003) extended Brown and 
Proschan (1983) imperfect maintenance approach to model preventive maintenance and 
obtained stochastic maintenance comparisons for the number of failures under different 
policies via a point process approach. Malik (1979) introduces the concept of improvement 
factor assuming that maintenance action changes the system time of the failure rate curve and 
the failure rate post maintenance lies between as good as new and as bad as old. Brown and 
Proschan (1983) reported that some possible causes for imperfect, worse or worst 
maintenance due to the maintenance performer, such as repair the wrong part, only partially 
repair the faulty part, repair the faulty part but damage the adjacent part are the true 
contributor. Nakagawa and Yasui (1987) reported that hidden failures which are not detected 
during the maintenance, human errors such as wrong adjustment and further damage done 
during maintenance and replacement with faulty parts. Dhillon (1986) reported that 
operation, assembly design, inspection, installation and maintenance are all prone to human 
errors. These errors are due to poorly written maintenance procedures, complex maintenance 
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tasks, harsh environment, fatigue, outdated maintenance manual, inadequate training and 
experience. Dhillon and Liu (2006) reported that reasons for the occurrence of human errors 
including inadequate lightning in the work area, inadequate training or skills of the 
manpower involved, poor equipment design, high noise level, an inadequate work layout, 
improper tools and poorly written equipment maintenance and operating procedure. They 
further classified that human error in six categories, (1) operating error (2) assembly error (3) 
design error (4) inspection error (5) installation error and (6) maintenance error. Dhillon and 
Yang (1995) cited that failure of repairable system can occur not only due to hardware failure 
but also due to operating human error or maintenance error. Factors such as temperature, 
dust, fatigue, incomplete or inappropriate maintenance tools, errors in inventory and personal 
problems may be the contributor for these errors. Noroozi et al. (2014, 2013) used Human 
Error Assessment and Reduction Technique for evaluating human error risk assessment and 
applied to pre- and post-maintenance procedure of a process facility and has also applied 
Success Likelihood method (SLIM) to perform human factors analysis in pre- and post-pump 
maintenance activities for offshore facility. The above referred literature covers inspection 
and maintenance interval modeling considering cost, reliability, availability and risk, 
imperfect maintenance and human error. However majority of these have discussed 
inspection and maintenance based on equipment by equipment basis. In reality, a process 
plant, a unit or system consists of hundreds of pieces of equipment that run in continuous 
mode. Further, possible human errors in the inspection and maintenance activities can impact 
equipment performance. For example, poor repair can play an instrumental role in increasing 
the number of equipment breakdowns or failure pattern which in turns can significantly 
increase the risk associated with equipment. Understanding the probability of human error 
   
 99 
while performing inspection and maintenance and including in the modeling will provide a 
better sight to reduce the overall risk and increasing reliability, availability and safety.  
Developing an inspection and maintenance strategy without considering the impact of these 
inspection and maintenance due to the shutdown of the plant and the associated risk due to 
human errors will not produce an optimum interval. This problem could be solved by 
considering a risk-based critical equipment selection and then by developing an optimized 
shutdown inspection and maintenance interval considering the imperfectness due to human 
error for the system or unit. The objective of this paper is to develop a risk-based shutdown 
inspection and maintenance optimization methodology by integrating HEP in the system 
failure model for a continuous processing facility. This proposed methodology will provide a 
rational basis to make a shutdown inspection and maintenance decision making considering 
human error contribution in inspection and maintenance and the overall risk exposure. 
4.3 A risk-based inspection and maintenance modeling considering 
human error  
Although several research have been published on inspection and maintenance 
interval modeling and optimization in the literature as discussed above, majority of these 
works deals to address the individual equipment. Consideration of shutdown inspection and 
maintenance modeling is found to be limited. Hameed et. al (2014) and Hameed and Khan 
(2014) has proposed a risk-based shutdown interval modeling for continuous operating 
facilities. These modelings are based on the assumption of the perfect maintenance. In reality 
majority of the time inspection and maintenance does not meet the perfect conditions and fall 
short. The result of imperfectness is induced due to the contribution of human error. Errors 
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induced during inspection and maintenance may be realized immediately and result in the 
premature failure of the equipment or system or in some cases may lie dormant with the 
equipment or system for some period of time, until a combination of other factor accelerate 
the degradation mechanism and lead to a failure. Some-time these have resulted in serious 
accidents in process industries. The proposed model is developed considering the human 
error which may be induced during the shutdown inspection and maintenance and is the 
extension of Hameed et. al (2014) and Hameed and Khan (2014). The objective of this paper 
is to integrating human errors in the system failure model and to interlink this with the 
operational risk. Higher the probability of failure of inducing the human error in inspection 
and maintenance, the degradation or the system failure probability will be more impacted. 
The proposed shutdown inspection and maintenance methodology is broken down in three 
modules and shown in Figure 4-1. Assumption in developing the model as well as detail of 
each module is described below; 
4.3.1 Assumptions for Model Development: 
o A group of equipment which cannot be inspected or maintained without taking the 
plant into non-operational mode (shutdown). 
o Failure as time-dependent process. 
o Material, labor, specialist, production cost are available. 
o The degree of imperfectness is assumed to be a number between 0 and 1 due to 
human error while performing inspection and maintenance.  
o Sufficient manpower and equipment are available to execute the planned job. 
o Inspection and maintenance durations are non-negligible. 
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Figure 4-1: A Risk based inspection and maintenance interval optimization model 
considering human error 
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4.3.2 Module 1: Equipment selection considering criticality of Operation: 
A processing facility consists of a large number of interacting systems or equipment. 
When these system or equipment performs together the facility delivers its intended function. 
These systems or equipment are subject to periodically or non-periodically planned 
inspection and maintenance during its life cycle. The inspection and maintenance 
management is one of the key decisions for continuously operating plants to improve the 
plant reliability, availability and integrity. Some of these system or equipment can’t be 
isolated to perform inspection and maintenance, and requires the plant to be taken in 
shutdown mode.  The remaining systems and units do not impact the overall facility 
operation and can be taken out for inspection and maintenance without causing facility 
operation shutdown. Thus, it is very critical to identify system or equipment for their 
inspection and maintenance to minimize the impact due to operation loss and to achieve 
required reliability and availability. The success to achieve an optimal inspection and 
maintenance plan for the facility depends on identifying and selecting these critical 
equipment. In this paper a risk criticality matrix is proposed to select these equipment. The 
uniqueness of the proposed matrix is to identify these critical equipment and system which 
will not only help to reduce the utilization of inspection and maintenance resources but also 
help to increase the reliability and availability of the unit. The process consists of the 
following steps; 
(1)  Developing a boundary diagram by breaking down units or plant into manageable 
system.  
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(2) Reviewing all equipment in the selected boundary using a risk matrix to establish 
the criticality in relation to the operation of facility, production loss and impact on 
asset damage. Proposed criticality matrix is shown in Figure 4-2.  
(3) Estimating the qualitative risk criticality number and comparing with the 
acceptable criteria. 
(4) If the risk number does not meet the acceptable criteria, include the equipment in 
shutdown inspection and maintenance planning. 
(5) Continue the process until the all equipment in the selected boundary has been 
analyzed. 
The advantage of this qualitative risk assessment helps to categories the equipment 
that will require a facility shutdown. For qualitative risk analysis, a criticality risk number 
may be developed depending on the company operational considerations. According to API 
(2009), risk-based inspection, for a qualitative risk analysis the likelihood of failure may be 
categorized from one through five. However, it is appropriate to associate an event frequency 
with each likelihood category to provide guidance to determine the probability of failure as 
shown in Table 4-1 and consequences are represented in monetary terms ($) as shown in 
Table 4-2. 
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Figure 4-2: Qualitative Criticality risk ranking matrix 
 
Table 4-1: Five Level of Probability of failure (Khan et al. (2014))  
Possible Qualitative Rank Annual likelihood of failure 
Frequent >0.1 
Probable 0.001 to 0.01 
Occasional 0.0001 to 0.001 
Remote 0.00001 to 0.0001 
Extremely Unlikely <0.000001 
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Table 4-2: Five Level Consequence Table (Khan et al. (2014)) 
Possible Qualitative Rank Economic Loss Range 
Negligible EL<$10,000 
Minor $10,000<EL≤$100,000 
Moderate $100,000<EL≤$1,000,000 
Major $1,000,000<EL≤$10,000,000 
Catastrophic EL>$10,000,000 
 
For the case of several competing consequences for equipment/components, the 
highest observed risk (criticality number) among the consequences should be considered to 
be the most critical component. Overall risk, R, can be selected using below equation: 
                                 
(4-1) 
4.3.3 Module 2: Component/System failure modeling considering human error 
Failure characteristics of the component or system are one of the most important 
parameter used to analyze and model the system failure or behavior. Since failure of a system 
is a probability, the rule of probability theory may be applied to compute the system failure 
probability from knowledge of component or system characteristics. 
4.3.3.1 System Failure Modeling: 
A unit or system may constitute pieces of equipment arranged in series, active 
redundancy or in standby. Very often, these redundancies or standby is designed to take full 
load in case of a functional failure to avoid unplanned shutdown. Operational relationships 
and knowledge regarding various system elements is required to develop a system failure 
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model. System failures cannot be evaluated and improved until it is known that how these 
various elements affect system operation. A true representation of these relationships is 
required for prediction and assessment based on either cost or risk. A functional block 
diagram is developed once the critical equipment are identified to represent their 
relationships and provide an indication of the element which must operate successfully for 
the system to accomplish its intended function. Depending on the functional block diagram, 
system reliability or failure model equation can be developed using either standard series or 
series-parallel equations. Further most often inspection and maintenance modeling is 
considered based on a fixed time interval between two consecutive inspection and 
maintenance. In this paper, it is assumed that the inspection and maintenance interval will be 
dictated by the risk considered and will vary between two consecutive shutdown inspection 
and maintenance as shown in Figure 4-3. Considering the variability in shutdown interval, 
the reliability of the system over the life cycle can be written as follows:  
               
 
   
        
 
   
  (4-2) 
Where; 
(1)       
 
    
(2)              is shutdown inspection and maintenance interval 
(3)      
(4)        
(5) ∆1>∆2>∆3>……>∆n 
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Figure 4-3: System Operational Availability 
4.3.3.2 Human error modeling in inspection and maintenance: 
Inspection and maintenance activities are critical to improve the reliability and 
availability of equipment. These activities are performed not only under immense pressure to 
bring the facility up and running in shortest period of time but also under difficult and 
hazardous conditions.  Even with all kind of technical advancement while designing the 
equipment or system, human involvement needs to be considered when performing 
inspection and maintenance. Human interactions with machines or systems are prone to 
introduce error while performing inspection and maintenance due to various factors.  Human 
errors during inspection and maintenance activities have already produced disastrous 
outcomes (in millions of dollars) such as Flixborough, Three Mile Island, Piper Alpha and 
Bhopal accident. Sometime human errors in inspection and maintenance may lie in dormant 
mode for a longer period of time before leading the equipment or system to failure. An 
example of a loosely secure nut during maintenance may produce vibration and result into a 
fatigue crack over period of time. Human errors such as misinterpretation of engineering 
drawings and maintenance manuals, inadequate training, poor working environment, time 
constraint and working environment as well as processing hazards are some factors which 
impact human performance. Swain and Guttmann (1983) have defined these factors as 
performance shaping factor (PSF) and listed several PSF which are linked with internal, 
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external, or stress related for complex man-machine interface for nuclear power plants. 
Wilson and McCutcheon (2003) reported that facility layout, workstation configuration, 
controls, hand tools, control systems, noise, vibration, lighting, temperature, force, repetition, 
posture, work schedule/workload, behavior based safety, labels/signs, communications, 
training, stress/fatigue, motivation, fitness/body size) are the areas where human factor 
should be considered. Toriizuka (2001) evaluated the importance of each PSF from the 
viewpoint of work efficiency, workload and human reliability. Any inspection and 
maintenance activity whether non shutdown or shutdown for a complex system consists of 
three major steps namely preparation activities, inspection and maintenance activities and 
boxing up/lining up activities before it is taken in operation. The above three steps consist of 
several sub-sets of task. Since these actions are performed by humans, there is always a 
probability of introducing an error. If the probability of inducing such human error is 
analyzed considering various PSF and represented by p, it can be integrated in to the system 
failure function of the equipment or system. Various techniques have been presented in 
literature to estimate the HEP. Some of the major techniques are Success Likelihood 
Indexing Method (SLIM), Technique for Human Error Rate Production (THERP), Justified 
Human Error Data Information (JHEDI) and Human Error Assessment and Reduction 
Technique (HEART). Kirwan (1996, 1997) and Kirwan et al. (1997) have discussed and 
validated these techniques in details. These techniques have been applied in Nuclear, Air and 
process industries. In this paper, SLIM technique is utilized to estimate human error 
probability and later integrated in the system failure probability. Figure 4-4 represents the 
SLIM process. SLIM process is based on developing the Performance Shaping Factors (PSF) 
and their impacts on human behavior. Generally an expert judgment is used to quantify PSF 
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which is used to derive a Success Likelihood Index (SLI) for each activity. A detailed set of 
task needs to be developed. Each task is reviewed in view of the considered PSF. Field and 
Technical expert judgments are used to assign a ranking and weighting to each PSF in terms 
of the influence on the success of a task. Eq. (4-4) is used to convert estimated SLI to 
estimate HEP. 
Select set of Performance 
Shaping Factor
Calculate PSF ranking
Determine PSF Weight
Determine SLI for each task
Predict HEP for each action
Calculate overall HEP
 
Figure 4-4: SLIM methodology to calculate HEP 
 
                
(4-3) 
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                    (4-4) 
 
Where, SLIk is the SLI for each activity k, Wj is the importance weight for the jth 
PSF, Rjk is the scaled rating of task k on the jth PSF. The overall probability of human error 
in inspection and maintenance can be calculated using Eq. (4-5): 
            
 
   
 (4-5) 
Incorporating inspection and maintenance HEP in Eq. (4-6) will result in: 
 
              
 
   
        
 
   
       
 
   
 
 
(4-6) 
  
Figure 4-5 represents the impact of human induced error in the survival function of 
the system and is compared with no inspection and maintenance. 
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Figure 4-5: Impact of Human Error in Survival Function 
  
4.3.4 Module III – Risk-based shutdown interval estimation 
Too frequent inspection and maintenance of equipment or system will increase not 
only the loss in revenue but also the overall operational risk exposure due to possible human 
error introduction in the system. On the other hand, an optimal inspection and maintenance 
interval will not only help to have better utilization of the inspection and maintenance 
resources but also reduce the risk of increased failure. It is necessary to express the 
probability of failure for a piece of equipment or a system as a function of time for risk-based 
shutdown inspection and maintenance interval estimation. In order to develop a risk-based 
shutdown inspection and maintenance interval, system failure probability considering human 
error and consequences are required to generate the overall risk exposure and are discussed 
below: 
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4.3.4.1 Estimation of system failure probability 
In general, operating companies keenly focus on targeting to maintain the desired 
reliability to achieve their operational goal.  Since the system failure probability is a function 
of failure rate and is complementary to the reliability of the system, mathematically it can be 
written as: 
 
                            
(4-7) 
 
                
 
   
        
 
   
       
 
   
  
 
(4-8) 
where t is the failure time of the system on or before a time      
A system or equipment failure can be modeled using exponential, Weibull, normal or 
lognormal probability distribution. Plant-specific inspection and maintenance data are the 
best source to identify the model. However, sometime due to the limited availability of plant- 
specific data, test data, data bank or expert judgment is also used. Weibull distributions due 
to its inherent flexibility such as normal (for β =3.4) and exponential (for β =1) distributions 
is most commonly used to model system failure probability. In this study, the Weibull model 
with the parameters β and θ is used to model the time dependent reliability of the equipment 
involved in the system. A decreasing failure rate (β<1) corresponds to an early life failure or 
infant mortality. A constant failure rate (β =1) suggests that items are failing from random 
events. An increasing failure rate (β>1) suggests that wear out is occurring and that parts are 
more likely to fail over time (Ghosh & Roy, 2009).  
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4.3.4.2 Estimation of the economic consequences: 
In general, process plants such as refineries, chemical plants, natural gas processing 
facilities equipment operate under extreme conditions (pressure and temperature).  It is due to 
these extreme operating conditions, failure consequences are not limited to the localized 
failure of component or equipment. Further these facilities process hazardous substances 
(hydrocarbons), failures due to leak of hydrocarbons may produce sever impact on the nearby 
assets, safety and health issues of the people and operational losses in the presence of an 
ignition source. For example in a gas processing plant, hydrocarbon release may result in 
flash fires, jet fires, pool fires, boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE), fire balls, 
vapor cloud explosions or toxic dispersion. In order to estimate the impact in the effected 
zones, operating pressure, temperature, physical and chemical properties and atmospheric 
conditions are required. Economic consequences due to these may be estimated based on the 
effects of thermal radiation and overpressure on surrounding equipment and personnel in 
monetary ($) terms for effected zones. Failure to consider these consequences when 
developing inspection and maintenance strategies for the facility may increase the 
operational risk. Hameed et al. (2014) has described various equations to estimate economic 
consequences in monetary ($) terms. Table 4-3 lists the summary of these equations which 
has been used here.    
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Table 4-3: Consequence Estimation (Khan et al. (2014)) 
Economic Consequence of Asset Loss 
 
Due to Heat Flux                      
(4-9) 
Due to Overpressure                 
(4-10) 
Economic Consequence of Human Health Loss (ECHHL) 
 
 
Due to Heat Flux                            
(4-11) 
Due to Overpressure                      
(4-12) 
Economic Consequence of Production Loss (ECPL) 
 
                
(4-13) 
   
Economic Consequence of Inspection and Maintenance (ECSIM) 
 
 
                
(4-14) 
                         
(4-15) 
                    
(4-16) 
                 
(4-17) 
                                   (4-18) 
The total economic consequences of shutdown (     
                              
 
        , (4-19) 
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where, x represents the various possible scenarios,      is the probability of damage 
due to heatflux in the effected zones and    is the asset density,      is the probability of 
damage due to overpressure,    is the effected zone due to overpressure,      is the 
probability of injury or death due to heatflux in the effected zones ,    is the population 
density and    is the cost of injury or fatality,      is the probability of damage due to 
overpressure, PL is production loss volume per day and SP is the selling price of the product 
per unit volume, SDT is the shutdown duration, Cp is the preparatory cost, Clp is the cost of 
preparatory maintenance labor per hour ($/h), tp is the duration of the preparatory work, CI is 
the inspection cost, ClI is the cost of skilled inspection labor per hour ($/h), CIe is cost of 
inspection equipment per hour ($/h), ti is the duration of inspection work, Cm is the 
maintenance cost, Clm is the cost of skilled maintenance labor per hour ($/h), Csp is the cost 
of spare parts consumed, tm is the duration of maintenance work, Cts is the technical support 
cost, Clts is the cost of a technical support specialist per hour ($/h) and t is the duration of 
technical support work in hours. 
4.3.4.3 Risk estimation: 
 
Since the risk is a combination of probability and the consequence, one needs to 
consider all possible consequences, including safety & health, operational and non-
operational consequences. In this paper, risk is estimated in terms of ($) value due to all 
possible combination and can be written as: 
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(4-20) 
4.4 The application of RBSIM to a LNG processing facility 
Sönmez et al. (2013) reported that energy plays a fundamental role in both 
manufacturing and services, and natural gas is rapidly becoming a key energy source 
worldwide. Since the last few decades liquefied natural gas (LNG) plants are increasing in 
number due to the growing demand for natural gas (NG) to meet the energy requirement. 
This trend is due to the fact that NG is the cleanest of the fossil fuels. LNG is a temporarily 
converted form of NG for storage and shipping because it occupies six hundred times less 
volume. The NG liquefaction process begins when the NG is extracted from the underground 
reservoirs and is sent to a liquefaction facility, where NG is liquefied at -160 
o
C. The 
liquefaction plants are asset intensive which operates on continuous basis. Unavailability of 
major equipment or system due to any failure may have severe consequences and produce 
significant risk to the operating companies due to production loss, asset damage, safety and 
company perception. A typical onshore LNG processing plant consists of several units as 
shown in the following Figure 4-6. Raw gas is received from either an onshore or offshore 
reservoir to the inlet/receiving area where condensate and water is separated from 
hydrocarbon. Hydrocarbon is then pre-treated to remove corrosive and hazardous contents. 
These include H2S, CO2, mercury, helium and water. The dry sweet gas is then cooled to 
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separate heavier hydrocarbon such as C3, C4 etc. Finally it is cooled in the cryogenic units to 
liquefy natural gas for storage and or shipping. In this paper, a section of gas chilling and 
liquefaction unit of a LNG processing facility is selected to develop shutdown inspection and 
maintenance interval for a targeted goal time to achieve a desired reliability (0.95). The 
general schematic and the block diagram of gas chilling and liquefaction unit section is 
shown in Figure 4-7 and is taken from Hameed and Khan (2014) previous work. The main 
purpose of the Gas Chilling and Liquefaction Unit is to condense the sweetened, dry, lean 
feed gas into LNG in the Main Cryogenic Heat Exchanger, and then sub-cool it in the Sub-
cooling Heat Exchanger. 
Offshore well 
head platform
Inlet facilities
Separation of Gas
Acid Gas Removal
Dehydration/ 
Mercury Removal
NGL Recovery
Gas chilling/
Liquefaction 
Waste Water 
Treatment
Condensate 
Treatment 
(Removal)
Sulfur Recovery 
(Change H2S to 
Liquid)
Liquid Sulfur 
Tanks
Fractionation
LPG (C3 & C4)
N2 Rejection 
(Removal of 
Nitrogen)
Refrigeration
LPG Tank
Condensate
Sulfur 
loading
LPG
loading LNG
LNG
loading
 
Figure 4-6: A typical LNG processing plant process flow 
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4.4.1 Module 1: equipment selection considering criticality of operation 
Equipment criticality analysis helps to evaluate how failure of these equipment 
impacts the performance of asset and is use to prioritize equipment selection for inspection 
and maintenance. Module I of the presented methodology is applied to select critical 
equipment using the risk criticality matrix. The risk criticality matrix helps to estimate the 
risk criticality number for all equipment in the unit for all considered consequences. Using 
the risk criticality matrix, equipment can have a criticality number ranging from 1 to 25. 
Criticality number 1 indicates that the equipment has least impact while a criticality number 
25 indicate significant impact on the risk. For example, if an equipment is having high 
probability (frequent = 5) of failure and the unavailability of the equipment having moderate 
impact on production, 50% loss (moderate = 3), the risk number will be 15, compared to an 
equipment which upon failure will result total loss of operation will get a criticality number 
of 25.  Higher criticality number indicates that the equipment will have higher risk on 
operational facilities due to the unavailability, and should be considered for a shutdown 
inspection and maintenance. Other risk factors can also be estimated to obtain the criticality 
number. In the considered unit, hydraulic turbines are design to take full load capacity, in 
case if one unit fails, other unit will take the load, hence it does not get a higher criticality 
number and is not considered for shutdown inspection and maintenance interval 
optimization. These can be inspected and maintained any time without taking the unit in 
shutdown. Equipment E01, E02, E03, E04, E05 and E06 as shown in Figure 4-7 are 
estimated to be having higher critical number and are selected for shutdown inspection and 
maintenance interval for the studied unit. 
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Figure 4-7: Gas Chilling and Liquefaction Unit 
 
4.4.2 Module 2: integrating human error in reliability modeling: 
A functional block diagram is developed for the selected critical equipment and is 
shown in Figure 4-8. System failure probability is calculated using the block diagram from 
the selected critical equipment. Since these equipment (in this unit) operate in series, 
reliability equation in series is appropriate for this scenario. In order to estimate the risk-
based inspection and maintenance interval, failure data is a key.  For this study, failure and 
repair data for the selected equipment are taken from the previously published work by 
Hameed and Khan (2014) and is listed in Table 4-4. 
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E01 E02 E03 E04 E05 E06
 
Figure 4-8: Functional block diagram of selected equipment 
 
Table 4-4: The failure Characteristics of considered equipment. 
Equipment No. 
Characteristic life 
(θ, h) 
Shape Parameter 
(β) 
E01 
282,000 4.38 
E02 
E03 
E04 
E05 
450,000 2.0 
E06 
 
All inspection and maintenance activities whether it is minor services, such as 
tightening the bolt or loose parts, cleaning and removing dust and rust, repairing and/or 
replacing degraded components such as bearing and seals, or performing welding to 
strengthen the integrity of the equipment requires human interaction. As discussed in Module 
II, various factors may introduced human error and result in accelerating the degradation or 
failure of the system. Table 4-5 list the considered PSF which may have impacts on the 
shutdown inspection and maintenance activities. Expert judgment from the experienced plant 
personnel are used to identify the significant Performance Shaping Factors and are listed in 
Table 4-5. These PSF are then ranked to select the top five PSF. Selected top five PSF were 
then assigned a weightage and is listed in Table 4-6. Table 4-7 list the general and common 
shutdown inspection and maintenance activities which were developed using field engineer’s 
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experience. This information was used to estimate the HEP for individual activities using Eq. 
(4-3) to Eq. (4-5) as discussed in Section 4.3.3.2. 
 
Table 4-5: List of considered PSF 
External PSF Internal PSF Stressors 
o Environment o Training 
o Fatigue, Pain or 
discomfort 
o Working hours, 
work breaks, shift 
rotations  
o Experience 
o Temperature and 
Radiations 
o Availability and 
adequacy of special 
equipment, tools 
and supplies 
o Knowledge of performance 
standards 
o Oxygen insufficiency 
o Method, Policies 
and Procedure 
o Stress (Mentally or bodily) o Vibration 
o Criticality and 
Complexity of Task 
o Work Memory o Movement limitation 
 o Physical Condition o Risk and Threats 
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Table 4-6 : Performance Shaping Factor, Rank and Weight 
Number Performance Shaping Factor Rank Weight 
1 Training 5 0.20 
2 Experience 4 0.25 
3 Time Pressure 3 0.20 
4 Work Memory 2 0.15 
5 Work Environment 1 0.20 
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Table 4-7:  Common Shutdown Inspection and Maintenance activities and estimated HEP. 
Task Number Task Description HEP 
1 Receive I&M work permit 0.001594 
 
2 Perform system blinding and isolation 1.47E-05 
3 Open entry points 0.00029 
 4 Install ventilation System 0.00029 
 5 Install internal/external lighting 1.47E-05 
6 Remove manways 1.47E-05 
7 Install internal/external scaffolding for I&M 1.47E-05 
8 Remove/Clean demisters, (if required) 0.000359 
 9 Clean Weld Joints, drains, nozzles etc. 0.010839 
 10 Carry out inspection 1.47E-05 
 11 Carry out repairing/maintenance works, 1.47E-05 
 12 Re-fix the demisters (if required) 1.47E-05 
 13 Remove Internal scaffoldings 1.47E-05 
 14 Re-fix internal manways 0.010839 
 15 Perform final inspection 5.07E-06 
 16 Final Internal Inspection 0.010839 
 17 Close entry points 1.47E-05 
 18 De-blinding & hydra tightening 1.47E-05 
 19 Close I&M work permit 1.47E-05 
  
4.4.3 Module III – risk-based shutdown inspection and maintenance interval:  
Module III of the proposed methodology consists of estimating system failure 
probability, all possible consequences due to process unit shutdown and finally developing a 
risk profile to find the optimal shutdown inspection and maintenance intervals. Since system 
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failure probability is the function of time, it is modeled here using Weibull distribution. To 
calculate the system failure probability, the Weibull distribution parameters of the equipment 
are used as discussed in Module II, thus the system failure probability function can be written 
using Eq. (4-8). Considered gas chilling and liquefaction unit is used to process hydrocarbons 
and operates at higher pressure and cryogenic temperature conditions, the consequences of 
failure will be very high. Failure scenario considered to estimates the asset damage and 
human health loss for these equipment is release of hydrocarbon which upon finding an 
ignition source may result in explosion which could generates shock waves. Calculated shock 
waves are then transformed in to probability of damage due to shock wave for various 
effected zones. This shock wave may cause serious asset damage as well as human injury or 
fatality. In this particular scenario, estimated consequence is based on a radius of 200m and 
is listed in Table 4-8. It is important to note that the loss of life or injury suffered to the 
people is hard to estimate in dollars value, however the cost associated with the 
compensation and corporate liability needs to be taken account in consequence analysis. In 
this regard, published note from Judycki (1994) of the US Department of Transportation and 
the Federal Highway Administration published relating the injury scale (in terms of severity) 
to the comprehensive costs in police-reported crashes is used. In this paper production loss is 
estimated using Eq. (4-13) for 10 days of shutdown is considered. Plant-specific data and 
field engineer supports to estimate number of manhour, labor and equipment cost is 
considered to estimate economic consequence of each shutdown inspection and maintenance 
interval.  
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Table 4-8: Estimated failure consequences 
Equipment No. 
Consequences of Asset damage and human health loss in terms of 
(Million dollars) 
E01 344.98 
E02 307.29 
E03 256.40 
E04 88.34 
E05 284.18 
E06 377.76 
 
The total calculated consequence along with Eq. (4-20) is used to generate the 
expected risk profile to determine the total number of shutdown intervals. Figure 4-9 show 
the obtained risk profile to achieve optimal shutdown inspection and maintenance interval, 
which would enable a level of 95.0% system reliability for a desired goal time while meeting 
the risk exposure to the lowest level. The shutdown inspection and maintenance interval is 
obtained from Figure 4-9. A sensitivity analysis is performed to study the effect of the 
number of shutdown days on the shutdown interval model. The results are plotted in Figure 
4-10. It is evident from Figure 4-10 that operational risk profile is increasing or decreasing 
with the increase or decrease of shutdown duration, due to the impact of production losses, 
however the number of shutdown required in achieving desired system reliability over the 
goal time does not have significant impact. Table 4-9 shows the estimated shutdown 
cumulative time. It is evident from Figure 4-9 that the overall operational risk is low when a 
total of six shutdowns with unequal intervals are performed under the given conditions to 
achieve minimum operational risk ($) per hour. The presented methodology does not only 
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provide optimal number of the facility shutdown interval but also suggest when these 
shutdowns should be planned to achieve target reliability, availability and to minimize the 
overall risk for the considered life of the facility. 
Table 4-9: Estimated Shutdown Cumulative time 
Shutdown Number Cumulative Time 
1 43222 h 
2 72014 h 
3 96487 h 
4 117289 h 
5 134971 h 
6 150000 h 
 
 
Figure 4-9: Risk-based shutdown inspection and maintenance 
    
200 
225 
250 
275 
300 
5 6 7 8 9 10 
R
is
k
 (
$
)/
H
r 
Number of Shutdowns 
Risk based Shutdown Optimization 
   
 127 
 
Figure 4-10: Risk-based shutdown inspection and maintenance 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Shutdown inspection and maintenance activities are performed to increase the 
availability and reliability of facility by selecting the critical equipment to optimize the 
overall risk profile. Risk assessment integrates the system failure probability and 
consequences. A risk-based shutdown inspection and maintenance helps to select the critical 
equipment and systems which can’t be inspected or maintained without taking the plant out 
of operation. This paper presents a risk-based shutdown inspection and maintenance intervals 
optimization for a processing facility unit considering human error which may be introduced 
during these activities. The unit considered in this study is a gas chilling and liquefaction unit 
of LNG facility.  In this study, SLIs were calculated for each activity and converted into HEP 
using SLIM methodology. Estimated HEP is then integrated in the probability of system 
failure. Shutdown inspection and maintenance consequences of selected equipment were 
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determined and expressed in financial values ($). The cost of inspection and maintenance 
were calculated using the plant data and/or using engineer’s experiences. System probability 
of failure couples with estimated consequences is used to generate operational risk profile. 
By including the HEP in system failure modeling, it is safe to say that shutdown inspection 
and maintenance planning  will help to obtain a risk profile which will not only allow 
achieving an optimal shutdown intervals but also the desired system reliability over the goal 
time by minimizing the overall risk. As the system operating life increases, the reliability 
decreases, which require shorter duration of inspection and maintenance to avoid excessive 
operational consequences. Duration of shutdown and the number of activities depends on the 
number of equipment selected which will go for inspection and maintenance and the scope of 
shutdown. The proposed methodology is an extension of Hameed and Khan (2014) and 
Hameed et al. (2014) to estimate shutdown interval, where in the previous studies, the impact 
of human error was not considered. Further these methodologies was considered to find a 
risk-based shutdown interval considering the equal interval whereas the proposed 
methodology helps to find optimal shutdown inspection and maintenance considering 
unequal interval over a goal time to minimize the overall operational risk. Risk-based 
shutdown inspection and maintenance interval methodology proposed in this paper can be 
applied and used for any processing or manufacturing facility. By using the risk criticality 
matrix, it is possible to select the critical equipment which should be considered for 
shutdown to optimize the overall risk.
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5 Chapter 5 
 
Risk-based maintenance scheduling for a LNG gas 
sweetening unit
 4
  
Abstract 
Significant productivity increase has been observed due to advanced automation in 
process operations, which has also caused increased complexity in the process.  The benefits 
from this investment can only be gained when a reliable performance with high availability 
and productivity is sustained. In process operations, a reliable performance requires well-
planned maintenance activities. A well-planned maintenance considers planned shutdown 
and its financial impacts. Due to increased process complexity, it is cost effective to adopt a 
risk-based approach for maintenance planning. In this paper, a risk-based approach for 
maintenance planning and scheduling for a gas-sweetening unit in a Liquefied Natural Gas 
(LNG) plant is discussed. A bi-objective scheduling optimization model is developed for 
maintenance planning. The two conflicting objectives: i) the minimization of total 
                                               
4 This Chapter is based on the submitted work in a peer-reviewed journal. Abdul Hameed, 
Syed A. Raza, Qadeer Ahmed, Faisal I. Khan and Salim Ahmed (2016), “Risk-based maintenance 
scheduling for a LNG gas sweetening unit,” Submitted to Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process 
Industries. To minimize the duplication, all the references are listed in the reference list. The 
contribution of the authors is presented in Section titled, “Co-authorship Statement”. 
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expenditures incurred on maintenance related activities and ii) improving the total reliability 
of a gas sweetening are considered. The simulation-based optimization framework is 
proposed to obtain a true Pareto-front using plant specific data and MATLAB 2015b built-in 
Genetic Algorithm procedure. The developed framework provides a rapid decision support 
tool for bi-objective problem embedded with the simulation-based optimization framework. 
5.1 Introduction 
Maintenance management is not only essential to manufacturing facilities but also 
highly critical to the asset intensive industries such as petrochemical, refineries and gas 
processing plants. These facilities consist of hundreds of equipment, which operate on a 
continuous basis.  Some of the equipment inspection and maintenance cannot be performed 
until the unit or facility is taken into shutdown, which poses a significant impact to the 
company revenue. On the other hand, some equipment maintenance can be planned without 
triggering the facility shutdown, here we termed it as non-shutdown strategy. Inspection and 
maintenance has three critical aspects, which, what, and when? ‘Which’ relates to selecting 
the equipment considering the operational risk, ‘What’ relates to define maintenance task or 
activity and ‘When’ explains the time these activities should be performed. The right task at 
the right time on the right equipment is essential to make sure that facility remains in reliable 
operational condition. Developing maintenance management is not only about developing 
maintenance strategies on individual equipment basis but also to minimizing the risk to 
operability of the facility due to shutdown. It is vital to understand the integration and design 
of the systems such as acting in series, parallel, combination of series-parallel, 50% load 
capacity or 100% load capacity to design an optimal inspection and maintenance strategy. 
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Campbell, Jardine, and McGlynn (2011) reported that typically inspection and maintenance 
cost ranges from 28% to 52% of the total operating cost of a plant. The significant cost 
associated with inspection and maintenance has encouraged researchers to develop efficient 
methods, techniques for inspection and maintenance which have been published over the 
years. When developing inspection and maintenance schedule, it is critical to consider which 
strategy should be applied to minimize unplanned downtime, overall cost, risk exposure and 
to effectively utilize skilled personnel and available spares. The inspection and maintenance 
scheduling optimization topic has gained much attention among researchers and industrial 
practitioners over the last few decades. However, it is noted that there is an opportunity to 
introduce shutdown and non-shutdown inspection and maintenance strategy in the 
optimization model to minimize the overall cost and maximize reliability.  
In this paper, a bi-objective risk-based maintenance scheduling optimization for a 
continuous processing plant considering facility shutdown is suggested. The proposed bi-
objective scheduling optimization is solved using an  - constraint method and GA. If the 
maintenance schedule is developed without considering the facility shutdown mode, it will 
not only result in too frequent intervals, but also have produced huge financial losses such as 
production loss and maintenance cost due to higher number of shutdown. The proposed 
maintenance optimization methodology considers multiple conflicting objectives; several 
constraints with a common goal of achieving lower cost, higher reliability and efficient 
maintenance schedule. The prime objective of the proposed maintenance schedule 
optimization is to minimize the overall maintenance cost and maximize the reliability of the 
physical assets. 
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5.2 Literature Research 
5.2.1 Maintenance of Natural Gas processing plant: 
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) processing plants are not only asset intensive and 
complex, but also require a heavy financial investment. A careful maintenance planning for 
LNG assets depends on the good understanding of assets configuration and their impacts on 
operation. Some equipment deteriorates over time and failure of these key equipment 
produces an undesirable event which can lead to the shutdown of the facility. A carefully 
designed maintenance planning for these critical equipment may prevent unwanted 
breakdown. Gowid, Dixon, and Ghani (2014) developed and proposed a system redundancy 
and maintenance interval optimization for a Floating Liquefied Natural Gas (FLNG) export 
platforms to reduce the total associated maintenance cost. This was achieved by identifying 
the optimum maintenance intervals for the major LNG liquefaction plant components. 
Keshavarz, Thodi, and Khan (2011) proposed a risk-based shutdown management strategy 
for LNG units. A combination of preventive maintenance, active redundancy and standby 
redundancy was considered to achieve an optimized shutdown maintenance strategy. These 
proposed optimization studies cannot be applied to the existing plant, as most of the facilities 
do not have redundancies for liquefaction units. Nwaoha, Yang, Wang, and Bonsall (2010) 
used GA to model risk-based maintenance and repair cost for a liquefied natural gas 
containment system and its transfer arm in conjunction with probabilistic risk assessment 
technique to improve system safety. When developing shutdown maintenance planning for 
LNG or processing facilities, realizing the criticality of the equipment to the operation is very 
important. Hameed, Khan, and Ahmed (2014); Hameed, and Khan (2014) have proposed a 
risk-based shutdown interval modeling for continuous operating facilities by selecting and 
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analyzing the risk of critical equipment to define the facility shutdown interval. In reality, not 
all assets in the LNG plant required a facility shutdown to carry out maintenance. Thus, the 
key question is to define what would be the maintenance activities for equipment and what 
would be the frequency? Frequent maintenance activities on these equipment may introduce 
accelerated failure due to human interface and produce severe negative financial impacts due 
to frequent shutdown; on the other hand few of the planned maintenance activities will not 
help in achieving a reliable operation of the facility either. Thus, a balanced or optimized 
maintenance schedule is required to meet the functional requirements considering facility 
shutdown.  
5.2.2 Risk-based maintenance optimization: 
Maintenance optimization is an active research topic. Single objective or multiple 
objectives optimization has been addressed under risk, reliability, availability, and cost. 
Backlund, and Hanu (2002) reported that while doing the risk analysis focus must be put on 
the function required of the subsystem and equipment. Garg, Monica, and Sharma (2013); 
Fitouhi, and Nourelfath (2014); Adhikary, Bose, Jana, Bose, D., and Mitra (2015); Salvador, 
and Juan-Carlos (2013); Ghosh, and Roy (2009); Rusin, and Wojaczeck (2012); Khan, and 
Haddara (2003, 2004a, 2004b) have presented methods to estimate the optimal maintenance 
and inspection interval considering cost, risk and availability. Bertolini, Bevilacqua, 
Ciarapica, and Giacchetta (2009) proposed a risk based inspection and maintenance strategy 
to minimize the overall risk considering time limit, budget and human resources. Zhaoyang, 
Jianfeng, Zongzhi, Jianhu, and Weifeng (2011); Wang, Cheng, Hu, and Wu (2012) proposed 
a risk rating criteria to select a maintenance strategy which reduces the overall risk. However, 
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the real-life optimization problems are quite complex and often intractable to solve using 
conventional optimization approaches.  
5.2.3 Meta-heuristics approach for maintenance optimization:  
There has been significant development in the heuristics-based approaches to solve 
large-scale problems. Silver (2004) stated that a metaheuristic is an iterative master process 
that guides and modifies the operations of subordinate heuristics to produce efficiently high-
quality solutions and presented an overview of various metaheuristic solution methods. 
Statistics presented by Jones, Mirrazavi, and Tamiz (2002) shows that 70% of the 
optimization problem used GA as primary meta-heuristic algorithms compared to 24% 
Simulated Annealing (SA) and 6% Tabu Search (TS). Dowsland (1996); and Chen, Vempati, 
and Aljaber (1995) reported that GA has been successfully applied to wide range of 
applications ranging from maintenance optimization to revenue maximization and so on. 
Moghaddam and Usher (2011) have explored maintenance scheduling using dynamic 
programming and introduction of heuristic algorithms in maintenance optimization with 
reliability, availability, and budget criteria. Painton, and Campbell (1995); and Coit and 
Smith (1996) have introduced meta-heuristics, for example GA, to effectively handle 
optimization problems in maintenance and reliability contexts. Hadi, Ashkan, and Isa (2012) 
presented a joint production, and maintenance scheduling model with multiple preventive 
maintenance services. A component-based heuristic algorithm was developed to solve the 
optimization model for a real field system while maintaining the architecture or components 
in a traction catenary system. Xu, Han, Wang, and Sun (2012) proposed a risk-based 
optimization model for system maintenance scheduling problem that consists of optimizing 
availability and cost of the system by balancing between system maintenance risk and failure 
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risk. Fu (2013) presented a selection of multiple maintenance strategy in process equipment. 
Three maintenance strategies namely, repair maintenance, preventive maintenance and 
preventive replacement on equipment reliability was analyzed. The harmony search 
algorithm was designed to solve the model, and the diversity of solutions was ensured by 
generating the new solution and the replacement process. Ahmadi, and Newby (2011) 
proposed an integrated model for the joint determination of both optimal inspection strategy 
and optimal repair policy for a manufacturing system whose resulting output is subject to 
system state. In this paper, an intensity control model adapted to partial information provides 
an optimal inspection intensity and repair degree of the system as an optimal control process 
to yield maximum revenue. Go, Kim, and Lee (2013) studied the problem of determining 
operations and maintenance schedules for a container ship equipped with various subsystems 
during its sailing according to a pre-determined navigation schedule. A mixed integer 
programming model is developed. Then, due to the complexity of the problem, a heuristic 
algorithm that minimizes the sum of earliness and tardiness between the due-date and the 
actual start time for each maintenance activity is discussed and improvement is reported over 
the experience based conventional method. Mirabedini, Mina, and Iranmanesh (2012) 
proposed a multi-objective integrated production and maintenance optimization using GA for 
multi parallel machines. Kancev, Gjorgiev, and Cepin (2011) proposed surveillance test 
interval optimization of standby equipment considering aging parameters uncertainty using 
GA. Esmaeili (2012) developed a single machine scheduling problem with maintenance 
activities to optimize total cost scheduling problem using GA.  
The above literature review clearly indicates that meta-heuristic such as GA has been 
successfully applied for maintenance scheduling optimization. However, it is found that 
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maintenance scheduling optimization considering facility shutdown for hydrocarbon facilities 
has not been explored extensively, and provides an opportunity to expand the application in 
this area. This paper is expected to contribute by developing a practical solution using  - 
constraint method, and GA to address the issue of efficient maintenance scheduling of LNG 
processing facility considering shutdown. In this work, inspection, maintenance and 
replacement are considered as various maintenance tasks to minimize the cost and maximize 
the system reliability. 
5.3 LNG Gas Sweetening Unit  
At atmospheric condition when natural gas is cooled to approximately        it 
takes the liquid form which is generally known as liquefied natural gas (LNG). The most 
significant advantage of liquefying natural gas is that in liquid forms the volume of natural 
gas gets reduced to 1/600th the volume of in its gaseous form, which helps to transport long 
distance using transporting vessels. A typical LNG processing plant schematic is shown in 
Figure 5-1. These equipment require timely maintenance to meet safety, availability and 
reliability of the facility. In the gas processing facility, raw natural gas received from 
reservoirs is processed to remove unwanted corrosive and hazardous material before it can be 
liquefied and transported. In majority of the gas processing facility, a three phase raw gas is 
received at onshore processing plant in the inlet-receiving facility where the gas, condensate 
and water are separated. Condensate is usually sent to the refinery for further processing to 
obtain by-products. The separated natural gas from the inlet-receiving facility is processed to 
remove sulfur in the form of hydrogen sulfide and water in gas sweetening unit before it can 
be converted in the liquefied form. A general schematic of a section of gas sweetening unit is 
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shown in Figure 5-2 . The main function of this unit is to remove H2S, CO2 and organic 
sulfurs from the stream and convert the gas into a sweet gas for further processing. Since this 
unit deals with highly corrosive and hazardous materials, equipment inspection and 
maintenance must be planned carefully to achieve reliable operation. Considering this, the 
proposed methodology has been applied to develop an optimized maintenance schedule 
under multiple constraints for a section of gas sweetening unit. 
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Figure 5-1: A typical LNG Process Plant (Mokhatab, Mark, Valappil, & Wood, 2014) 
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Figure 5-2: A typical Section of gas sweetening unit 
 
Effective maintenance is one of the key functional areas in industry to address safety, 
reliability, plant uptime and maintenance cost. To address these objectives, maintenance 
optimization has gained momentum in understanding equipment failure modes, equipment 
age, remaining useful life and the disadvantages of only performing time-based maintenance. 
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Estimation of equipment age is a difficult task which drives the conservative maintenance 
schedules. This results in performing maintenance too early when it is not required and 
possibly introducing the effect of poor workmanship or human error. On the other hand, if 
the interval between successive maintenance is increased equipment may run into the risk of 
unscheduled breakdown. This situation results a demanding area of interest for the industry 
and researcher. The concept of inspection and maintenance management is not restricted to 
only the strategy but also how the strategy is being selected considering system process flow, 
equipment design, its maintainability, and so on. A continuous operating facility such as 
LNG processing plant operates in rigorous condition, 365 days a year. Developing a 
maintenance schedule for these equipment depends on the system configuration. These 
systems are designed in various possible configurations such as acting in series, parallel, 50% 
load sharing, 100% load sharing; thus results in two major scenarios a shutdown or non-
shutdown  maintenance strategy. Majority of the model presented in literature for 
maintenance optimization has not been specific to consider facility shutdown scenarios. This 
shortcoming provides an opportunity to integrate concept of shutdown in maintenance 
strategy to minimize cost and maximize system reliability considering aging of the 
equipment and error introduced in the system. Risk is usually based on the consequence and 
probability of an equipment breakdown or failure. Risk also relates to the operability, the 
operating pressures, temperatures, and age of the facilities. Maintenance planning and 
scheduling is important due to its direct impact on the reliability of the facility. The right 
maintenance activity at the right time is the goal of any maintenance organization. However, 
due to shortage of resources and to meet production demand sometimes a compromise is 
made by delaying the schedule task. Current maintenance strategies focus not only on 
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keeping the plant in operation but also on efficient utilization of equipment through quality 
and service. Processing liquefied natural gas is a hazardous process requiring considerable 
safety. It is a cryogenic process where the operating temperature is around -164 °C and any 
failure can have catastrophic consequences. Hence, effective and optimized maintenance is a 
key to safety, reliability and to minimize overall maintenance cost. Maintenance strategy for 
hydrocarbon processing facilities is important not only because of critical application but also 
due to the high cost of unplanned or planned shutdowns on revenues due to production loss. 
These motivating factors are behind the formulation of a maintenance scheduling 
optimization model. 
5.4 Risk-based Bi-Objective Maintenance Scheduling Model 
In this section, a risk-based bi-objective mathematical model for maintenance 
scheduling for the gas sweetening process of a LNG plant is presented. 
5.4.1 Assumptions: 
Following are the assumptions to ensure the models are representative of real plant 
operations. These assumptions are the basis of bi-objective optimization.  
o Equipment time to failure follows increasing failure with known or estimated shape 
and characteristics life parameter. 
o Material, labor, specialist, and production cost are available. 
o Labor cost/unit time is independent of equipment. 
o Sufficient manpower and equipment are available to execute the job once planned. 
o Inspection and maintenance times are non-negligible 
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5.4.2 Notations: 
The following notations are used. 
Sets 
 
  Set of Equipment, indexed such that                  
  Set of time period intervals,  indexed such that                   
 
Decision Variables 
     
                                                                
          
  
     
                                                                
          
  
     
                                                               
          
  
 
Parameters 
L Length of the planning horizon 
    Cost of corrective (failure) task of equipment   
     labor cost/hour to perform a corrective task of equipment m 
    Cost of replacement of components in equipment   
     labor cost/hour to perform a replacement task of equipment m 
    Cost of maintenance of equipment   
     labor cost/hour to perform a maintenance task of equipment m 
     cost of material of an equipment m 
    Cost of inspection of equipment  
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     labor cost/hour to perform an inspection task of equipment m 
    Expected total inspection and maintenance cost 
   High pressure 
   Low pressure 
     Overall system reliability 
    Corrective repair time at equipment m 
    time required to perform a maintenance at equipment m 
    time required to perform a replacement at equipment m 
    time required to perform an inspection at equipment m 
   Shape parameter of equipment   
   Scale parameter of equipment   
   Improvement factor of equipment  
   Rate of occurrence of failure (ROCOF) 
   failure cost factor of equipment m 
       Expected number of failures of equipment  at time t 
    Reliability of an equipment  at time   
     Age of equipment  at start of period   
     Age of equipment  at end of period   
5.4.3 Preliminaries: 
In a typical LNG production facility, many maintenance actions are taken to ensure 
the functionality of each equipment by properly capturing its failure modes and assigning 
suitable tasks such as inspection, preventive maintenance or replacement. One of the 
objectives of this work is to develop maintenance task such as inspection, preventive 
maintenance and repair schedule for each equipment ( ), for a planning horizon ( ). While 
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developing this optimized maintenance schedule, the overall planning horizon is broken in 
equally spaced period i.e.      . At the end of each period, the system is analyzed to select 
which maintenance activity should be performed such as inspection (I), preventive 
maintenance (M) or replacement (R). Here the inspection task is considered to be an operator 
based inspection. These inspections (I) activities are specific to the operators using their 
sensory element such as visuals, hear, touch and feel to analyze the equipment behavior and 
report to the maintenance team if any un-wanted condition is observed such as noise, leak 
etc. etc. Based on the operator based inspection, if required, maintenance team performs the 
detail investigation and takes any necessary action. The operator based inspection does not 
change the failure rate of the equipment. At the same time, operator based inspection ease the 
maintenance resource utilization and helps in reducing the maintenance cost. In contrast, a 
predefined planned maintenance such as oil change or grease filling help to improve the 
degradation in the equipment failure characteristic. In industry these actions are called as 
preventive maintenance or simply maintenance (M). These actions help to improve the 
condition of the equipment. However, there is always a chance of introducing human error. 
Further, a corrective maintenance action is taken if a sudden failure of a component is 
observed while the system is in operational state. Corrective task or replacement task is 
synonymously being used in the industry. Corrective task is initiated when a sudden failure 
of equipment is observed. On the other hand, a replacement activity (R) may be of a planned 
replacement of seal, bearing and other components which may be in the wear-out zone of the 
failure characteristic. These actions will improve the equipment condition. Ahmed et al. 
(2015) has discussed these activities in greater details.  
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Many state-of-the-art computerized maintenance management systems have been 
developed to manage, execute, record and track these activities. These systems also help to 
obtain real operational failure data to perform equipment and system studies and failure 
investigations. 
5.5 Operational Risk-based Equipment Selection: 
A risk-based approach for equipment selection to a section of gas sweetening unit of a 
LNG plant is outlined in this section.  As described earlier in Section 5.3 (Figure 5-2) that a 
typical gas sweetening unit in an LNG plant consists of a large number of equipment and it 
would be very difficult to plan and manage the maintenance activities at once. Indeed, some 
equipment are likely to be at more risk of failure such as rotating equipment compared to 
stationary equipment.  Also in certain cases, a planned maintenance action on some of the 
equipment cannot be performed, and requires the unit or plant to be taken out of operation. 
This situation is generally known as shutdown. On the other hand, some units or equipment 
do not impact the overall facility operation and hence, maintenance activity can be performed 
during normal operation. Identifying and integrating such systems and equipment is one of 
the most important aspects to achieve a risk-based optimal maintenance schedule without 
impacting operability and loss of revenue due to un-necessary shutdowns. A sound approach 
will be to plan and schedule maintenance activity considering the operational risk of the 
facility.  
Generally risk is defined as the resultant of the probability of an undesired event and its 
consequences. Assessing and performing a risk assessment require a cross-functional team 
with detailed knowledge about the system and function being analyzed. Risk can be 
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measured in using the probability of failure and its relation to multi facet consequences such 
as operation loss due to facility shutdown, inspection and maintenance cost due to incorrect 
planning, environment and safety impacts on the facility and people. API (2009) guideline 
suggests that a risk matrix is an effective tool to show the distribution of risk associated with 
a plant or a process. The size of a risk matrix may vary, such as 5  5, 4 4 and so on. In this 
study, a 3×3 risk assessment matrix is used to segregate and categorize equipment for 
inspection and maintenance considering a unit or facility shutdown. A 3×3 risk matrix for 
probability of loss of operation and consequence ($) is shown in Figure 5-3.  To exemplify, if 
the consequence is as high as 3 and the probability of the failure is high as 3, the risk 
exposure will be maximum i.e. 9. In order to apply the risk matrix, facility needs to be 
broken down into small manageable units. All equipment in the gas sweetening unit of LNG 
plant are reviewed using the risk matrix to identify a quantitative measure of risk (also 
known as risk index) representing the impact on facility operability. Equipment having 
impact on facility operation with a higher risk index should be given higher priority in 
planning for shutdown inspection and maintenance strategy while others with a lower risk 
may be considered lower in the priority. This assessment process is performed for all 
equipment until the complete unit is analyzed as shown in Figure 5-2. One significant 
advantage of using the risk segregation would be to allocate and use skilled resources for the 
systems which are critical for plant operability and availability. Further, the proposed risk 
assessment will help to establish the equipment or system which will require facility 
shutdown for inspection and maintenance and help to make better planning. However, it 
should be noted that the risk criteria can vary from organization to organization, depending 
on their exposure and tolerance to absorb the consequences of the facility shutdown. 
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Figure 5-3: Operational Risk-based Equipment Selection 
  
5.5.1 Modeling equipment failure mode: 
While modeling the equipment failure mode, equipment is classified as repairable or 
non-repairable. Repairable equipment may include compressors, turbines, pumps, motors, 
valves etc. In contrast to this, non-repairable systems are more often the electronic modules. 
Generally corrective maintenance activities are taken when a repairable system fails. 
However, this strategy creates significant economic consequence in contrast to a planned 
maintenance which could be of inspection, preventive maintenance or replacement nature. 
Knowing and understanding the failure mode and their modeling is vital in developing the 
planned maintenance schedules for a reliable plant operation. Failure data obtained from 
actual operation provides better insight when developing the model as operational failures 
occurs under the actual operation and environments and provides an accurate representation 
of system behavior. Kapur and Lamberson (1977) reported that Weibull distribution is 
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considered as generalized failure model and is often used in reliability analysis due to its 
inherent flexibility to model increasing or decreasing failure rates. In reality equipment 
failure pattern does not always tend to be independent of each other; in this case a Non-
Homogeneous Poisson Process (NHPP) can be used to model the time-dependent random 
failures. Ahmed, Moghaddam, Raza, and Khan (2015); Moghaddam and Usher (2011) and 
many other researchers have used this approach. In this article we assume that the selected 
equipment are repairable. It is also assumed that failure, repair, replacement and inspection 
task can be scheduled and time to failure follows a NHPP. Each equipment in the system is 
assumed to have an increasing failure rate. For non-homogeneous Poisson process, failure 
rate is a function of time. As we are considering increasing failure rate, Rate of Occurrence 
of Failure (ROCOF),       is given by Eq. (1); 
               
                  (5-1) 
In Eq. (5-1)        ,    are scale parameter, shape parameter, and t is the time 
interval. Using Eq. (5-1), expected number of failures can be computed as follows: 
 
          
    
    
                
            
    
                     
(5-2) 
5.5.2 Equipment age estimation: 
Age of an equipment,   at a given time,   with respect to the different tasks such as 
inspection (I), Maintenance (M), and Replacement (R) is estimated by Ahmed et al. (2015) 
and is represented in Eq. (5-3) to Eq. (5-7).  Further, the maintenance task is considered to be 
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imperfect, and therefore after the maintenance task the equipment does not return to as good 
as new (AE=0) and its age is reduced by a factor    for an equipment, m.  
 
Inspection Task 
                                  (5-3) 
Maintenance Task: 
                                     (5-4) 
Replacement Task: 
 
                            (5-5) 
                              (5-6) 
Considering the above maintenance task, if the age of the system at the end of each 
period t for equipment m can be obtained from Eq. (7) 
           
 
 
                      (5-7) 
5.5.3 Maintenance activities costing: 
 Performing a maintenance activity such as inspection, corrective or preventive 
maintenance and replacement for any equipment requires skilled resources and materials. 
Consuming these resources derives various cost activities and is an increasing function 
depending upon the nature and number of time action is taken over the life span of the 
facility. The economic consequence (cost) of these activities has been discussed in detail by 
Ahmed et al. (2015) and is summarized in Eq. (5-8) to Eq. (5-11).  
 
 
Inspection Task: 
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                                      (5-8) 
Where in Eq. (8),      is the time for inspecting equipment    and        is the cost of 
labor for inspection. 
Maintenance Task: 
                                      (5-9) 
Where in Eq. (9),      is the time required to carry out maintenance of equipment    and  
      is the cost of maintenance labor. 
Replacement Task: 
                                 (5-10) 
Where in Eq. (5-10),      is the time required to replace an equipment  ,      is 
the cost of replacement labor and      is the replacement material cost. Due to various 
failure natures, the material cost is not considered here. 
In the case of a failure, an unplanned replacement is carried out. It is assumed that 
this cost of replacement due to failure would be;   
                                     (5-11) 
Where in Eq. (5-11),      is the time required to replace a failed equipment  ,      
is the cost of labor to replace a failed equipment,    is the failure cost factor of equipment 
m, and      is the replaced material cost. 
In addition to the above, one of the major and significant cost contributor is the 
production loss due to the facility shutdown. Since, in this proposed methodology, the 
maintenance schedule is designed such that there is no impact on operational availability; the 
cost of production loss is not considered.   
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5.5.4 System reliability estimation: 
We assume that the failure rate function of an equipment follows an increasing failure 
pattern and the rate of failure of occurrence for repairable system follows a NHPP, the 
reliability,     of an equipment m for a given period t  is computed using Eq. (5-12), 
 
 
      
                    
            
    
                    
(5-12) 
However, when various subsystems are interlinked to each other, the system functionality 
depends on the function of each of the subsystem considered. Considering that the failures of 
each subsystem are independent, the system reliability is the product of the reliability of each 
individual subsystem for a considered interval. Thus for a system acting in series, reliability 
equation can be written as, 
 
          
           
            
   
   
   
   
   
  (5-13) 
5.6 Bi-objective model formulation 
Damghani, Abtahi, and Tavana (2013) reported that epsilon-constraint method is one 
of the methodologies to solve multi-objective optimization. In this method decision makers 
select one objective function out of n to be optimized, while the remaining objective 
functions are put as a constraints to be less than or equal to given target values. We use an 
epsilon-constraint framework, and this has been used in other areas of research as well.  
Berube, Gendreau, and Potvin (2009) provided evidences that Pareto set of bi-objective 
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problem can be generated more efficiently using the epsilon-constraint method. Laumanns, 
Thiele, and Zitzler (2006); Amirian and Sahraeian (2015); and Morabi, Owlia, Bashiri, and 
Doroudyan (2015) have used this method for multi-objective decision problem. 
In this paper expected total estimated cost (   ) and system reliability (    ) are 
considered as the two objectives to optimize and the decision is the complete schedule for 
inspection (I), Maintenance (M), and Replacement (R) 
 
             
                                   
   
   
   
   
             
(5-14) 
             
           
            
   
   
   
   
   
 (5-15) 
5.             
6.  
                   (5-16) 
 
                                 
                    
(5-17) 
           
 
 
                     (5-18) 
               (5-19) 
             (5-20) 
                   (5-21) 
Eq. (5-16) to Eq. (5-21) represents various constraints used in designing the model. 
Where, Eq. (5-16) sets the initial age to zero for each subsystem at the beginning of the 
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planning horizon, Eq. (5-17) and Eq. (5-18) are used to estimate the effective age of the 
equipment due to various activities performed over the period, Eq. (5-19) prevents 
simultaneous activities scheduling for an equipment, Eq. (5-20) makes sure that in all cases 
the equipment age at the beginning or end of the period is always positive and more than zero 
and finally Eq. (5-21) defines various maintenance activities as a binary variables and 
restricts the values to be positive numbers. 
5.6.1 Proposed solution approach 
In Figure 5-4, a solution framework is presented. It is mainly a simulation-based 
optimization approach. The risk-based equipment selection has been completed in section 5.5 
and a bi-objective nonlinear integer program (BONIP) is proposed in section 5.6. Next, 
following the solution suggested in Figure 5-4, we developed an  -constraint method to 
transform BONIP into a single objective function which can be solved more conveniently. 
 
 
             
                                   
   
   
   
   
             
(5-22) 
            
                (5-23) 
 
And constraints defined in Eq. (16) to Eq. (21). 
. 
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In Single Objective Nonlinear Integer Program (SONIP), the reliability objective      
is transformed as a constraint.  
5.6.2 Decision variables re-orientation: 
In Figure 5-5, we have explored the structure of the decision variables (    
       ) and have shown how we can generate a schedule ( ).  We can observe here that 
using the schedule,  , it reduces the decision variables from            to  considerably 
less,         variables in the schedule,  . Each cell in the Schedule matrix can take either 
of three actions:  Inspection ( ), Maintenance ( ), or Replacement (  . 
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Figure 5-4: Proposed solution framework 
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Figure 5-5: Decision Variable re-orientation 
 
Using re-orientation presented in Figure 5-5, we can reduce the total number of 
decision variable to exact one-third of the original problem      .  Thus, we get a reduced 
problem       .  We observe that in        the decision variable is    
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(5-24) 
            
                (5-25) 
 
The matrix   contains elements as outlined in Figure 5-5. Using Eq. (24), we can 
compute ETC by recoding             into    ,    , and    . Given      , then 
     ,      ,      . Similarly for other values of    , the     ,    , and      are  
easily  translated. Notice that constraints in Eq.(16)-(21) are removed as the proposed 
solution using schedule,    resolves the selection decision among the three operation 
       ,  that was earlier addressed using, into    ,    , and    . Similarly, for a given 
schedule,  , the reliability,       can be estimated using Eq. (15) 
5.6.3 Genetic Algorithm (GA) implementation: 
GA is a meta-heuristic, which belongs to the class of evolutionary algorithms (Deb, 
2001). It mimics the process of natural evolution like inheritance, mutation, selection, and 
crossover in pursuit to find the best solution to an optimization problem (Kaveshgar, Huynh, 
& Rahimian, 2012). In the proposed solution framework as shown in Figure 5-4, we have 
utilized the GA provided in Global Optimization tool in MATLAB (2015b). The current 
version of the toolbox has incorporated increased functionality and enables the built-in GA 
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procedure to handle the nonlinear mixed integer optimization problem (NLMIP) such as the 
one presented in       .  In the following we discuss the important features. 
The procedure starts with the knowledge of the input data form the LNG plant gas 
sweetening process unit. The data includes information regarding equipment failure, and the 
estimated cost for each equipment regarding the inspection, preventive maintenance, planned 
replacement, and replacement or repair. The planning horizon is also decided at this stage. 
There are four main procedures a typical GA implementation performs:  
5.6.3.1 Initial population generation: 
Typically GA procedure starts with the creation of a randomly generated initial 
population. Using the decision variable re-orientation framework presented in Figure 5-6 an 
individual solution, ‘schedule’,   which is also referred to as chromosome is randomly 
generated. The population size valuation could be arbitrarily set in the population generation 
option in ‘gaoptimset’ in the MATLAB (2015b) ‘ga’ procedure. In Figure 5-4, the procedure 
is represented in Step 1 in the GA related operators which is repeated for each simulation. In 
this implementation we have generated initial population using ‘PopulationSize’ parameters 
in ‘gaoptimset’.In the following, the main procedure of MATLAB (2015b) ‘ga’ along with 
the options used is presented.  
‘options =gaoptimset('PopulationSize', 'Generations', 'EliteCount', 'TolFun', 'PlotFcns', 
@gaplotbestf)’ 
The MATLAB 2015b built-in procedure used is: 
‘[x,fval,exitflag] = ga(@cost_obj,nvars,[],[],[],[],lb,ub,nonlcon1,IntCon,options), 
Table 5-1 and Table 5-2  outline the user-defined and built-in parameters selection. In 
addition to the stated parameters in Table 5-1 and Table 5-2, all other parameters in ‘ga’ 
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procedure are set to their default values. A detailed documentation on how ‘ga’ built-in 
procedure works is available at MATLAB (2015b)
a
 Global Optimization Toolbox. However, 
the problem that we have addressed here is an integer program which requires several 
modifications to basic ‘ga’ procedure. In this implementation for ‘ga’ procedure for our 
problem, we have restricted to default settings for crossover, mutation, special creation in 
order to keep the decision variables integers. These details on default settings can be found at 
MATLAB (2015b)
b
 Global Optimization Toolbox. 
Deep et al. (2009) have discussed the use of GA for constrained integer programming 
problems.  ‘ga’ procedure used penalty functions as suggested in Deep et al. (2009) and Deb 
(2000) for handling nonlinear constraint in       .  The MATLAB (2015b) built-in function 
‘ga’ also suits this implementation of the integer variable problems as there are no equality 
constraints in       .  Due to integer variables, no custom creation functions such as 
(‘CreationFcn’ option), crossover function (‘CrossoverFcn’ option), mutation function 
(‘MutationFcn’ option), or initial scores (‘InitialScores’ option) can be user-supplied in ‘ga’. 
These functions are self-selected in MATLAB default setting in ‘ga’ procedure. In the 
simulation, to maintain the integer decision variables, ‘ga’ have used special creation. 
Crossover, and mutation functions, and their detailed documentation is also available at 
MATLAB (2015b)
c
 Global Optimization Toolbox. 
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Table 5-1: MATLAB (2015b) built-in procedure ‘ga’ related selected parameters in 
‘gaoptimset’ 
Parameters Remarks Selection value(s) 
‘PopulationSize’ The number of individual chromosomes 
(solutions) in a generation  
150 
‘Generations’ Total number of generations explored in  
simulation run 
500 
‘EliteCount’ Number of individual in the current generation 
guaranteed to survive for next generation. 
10 (MATLAB 2015b, 
default) 
‘TolFun’ Function tolerance, i.e., the different between the 
objective values improved  
1e-08 
‘PlotFcns’ Optional. It is used to graph the best total expected 
cost 
Built-in parameters 
 
‘SelectionFcn’ 
Selection options specify how the genetic 
algorithm chooses parents for the next generation. 
Binary tournament, 
default for integer 
problem 
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Table 5-2: MATLAB (2015b) built-in procedure ‘ga’ user-defined functions and parameters 
Parameters Remarks Selection value(s) 
@cost_obj User-defined function to compute the total 
expected cost  
Not applicable  
nvars Total number of decision variables. A column 
vector of size 168 containing values, ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’ 
           , where 
   , and     , 
Indicators 
1= Inspection,  
2= Maintenance,   
3= Replacement 
lb Lower bound column vector of size 168 all 
values are ones, i.e., lb=ones(168,1) 
1= Inspection 
ub Lower bound column vector of size 168 all 
values are set at three, i.e., ub=3 * ones(168,1) 
3= Replacement  
Nonlcon User-defined non-linear constraint for reliability   
IntCon The total number of integer values.  Set to 168, since         
   . All variables are 
integers. 
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Figure 5-6: Population representation in a typical generation 
 
5.6.3.2 Cost and reliability estimation: 
For a given schedule,    as an individual chromosome in the population the expected 
total cost, (   ) is computed using Eq. (14) using the decision variable orientation 
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1 1 1 1 1 ---- 1
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procedures outlined in Figure 5-4 and Figure 5-5. Similarly, we also estimate reliability for  - 
constraint method using Eq. (15). 
5.6.3.3 Crossover and mutation: 
As discussed previously in Section 5.6.3.1, ‘ga’ procedure restricts a customized 
selection for crossover and mutation related parameters.   
5.6.3.4 Stopping criterion: 
There are several stopping criteria that are employed with built-in ‘ga’ function in 
MATLAB (2015b).   The details on the stopping criterion can be found in MATLAB 
(2015b)
d
 Global Optimization Toolbox. We have selected the default stopping criterion, with 
the exception to two criteria: ‘Generations’ and ‘TolFun’.  The selected values for these 
parameters are provided in Table 5-1. 
5.7 Simulation Study 
5.7.1 Operational Risk-based Equipment Selection: 
Operational risk-based equipment selection process as discussed in Section 5.5 is 
applied to a section of gas sweetening unit as shown in Figure 5-2. The proposed operational 
risk-based equipment selection generated two categories of equipment as listed Table 5-3. 
From the operational risk analysis, it is evident that maintenance scheduling of all columns, 
drums and recontactor cannot be done unless the unit is planned for a shutdown and requires 
a shutdown maintenance strategy to develop the maintenance plan. Shutdown inspection and 
maintenance modeling has been presented by Hameed, and Khan (2014) and Hameed et al. 
(2014). On the other hand, for the remaining equipment maintenance scheduling can be 
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planned and optimized without shutting down the facility. The proposed model is applied to 
develop an optimized maintenance schedule for selected equipment considering facility non-
shutdown maintenance strategy.  
Table 5-3: Operational Risk-based Equipment Selection 
Equipment requiring shutdown 
maintenance strategy 
Equipment requiring  
non-shutdown maintenance strategy 
Washing column Wash water circulation pumps 
Absorber  Skim oil pumps 
HP recontactor Makeup water pumps 
LP recontactor AFA pumps 
HP flash drum Drain pumps 
LP flash drum Rich sulfinol pumps 
Drain drum Lean sulfinol pumps 
 
5.7.2  Equipment Failure Model: 
Equipment failure history and repair data are generally stored in the maintenance 
management systems. Data from a LNG plant gas sweetening unit was analyzed and 
presented by Ahmed et al. (2015). In this study we use the same information. However, some 
of the data has been revised based on the information received from field engineers for some 
of the selected equipment. These data are presented in Table 5-4. Further, we have 
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considered 24 months of planning horizon to develop maintenance scheduling optimization 
strategy for the selected units. 
Table 5-4: Failure Data  
m 
Equipment requiring  
non-shutdown maintenance 
strategy 
λm 
(failure/hr) 
βm αm 
1 Wash water circulation pumps 0.000436 1.2 0.4 
2 Skim oil pumps 0.00029 1.9 0.6 
3 Makeup water pumps 0.000152 2.5 0.6 
4 AFA pumps 0.0001316 1.7 0.5 
5 Drain pumps 0.0001104 1.8 0.4 
6 Rich sulfinol pumps 0.00066 2.1 0.3 
7 Lean sulfinol pumps 0.00075 1.9 0.3 
5.7.3 Inspection and Maintenance Cost: 
Majority of the published maintenance optimization model considers a time-based 
maintenance regardless of the condition of the equipment and follows a predefined interval 
by original equipment manufacturers. These pre-defined intervals set up set of activities in 
the form of work orders which is triggered automatically without considering the available 
resources and the shutdown of the system. In some cases multiple activities overlap and 
result in scheduling problems as well. Generally in Computerized Maintenance Management 
System (CMMS), data such as time required for completing a pre-defined inspection, 
maintenance, and replacement, as well as the cost of all associated skilled worker and 
required equipment is also stored and readily available for references. Table 5-5 present the 
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estimated cost ($/event) related to failure (CFm), repair (CRm), maintenance (CMm) and 
inspection (CIm) for all considered equipment. These values are estimated using Eq. (5-8) to 
Eq. (5-11) and plant specific CMMS data and field personnel.   
Table 5-5: Inspection and Maintenance Cost Data 
M 
CFm 
($/event) 
CRm 
($/event) 
CMm 
($/event) 
CIm 
($/event) 
1 970 480 190 20 
2 1900 1080 190 20 
3 1850 1050 190 48 
4 1050 480 240 36 
5 1000 450 240 36 
6 800 320 180 45 
7 800 320 200 40 
5.7.4 Numerical results: 
Selected results of the solution run for developed model on the case study is presented 
in Table 5-6 and Table 5-7. The optimal maintenance schedule for the set of equipment, 
obtained from GA optimization procedure is presented in terms of corresponding Pareto 
Front as showed in Figure 5-7 within the objective function space. Pareto Front shown in the 
referred figure is comprised of 42 points i.e. a total of 42 possible optimal solutions of the 
objective functions. The Pareto front shown in Figure 5-7 is developed based on the 42 
optimal solutions corresponding to the range of reliability from 0 to 0.99. The convergence 
graph clearly indicates that the cost increase exponentially when the target reliability is set to 
be more than 80% and is in line with the practical expectation.  Higher cost associated with 
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higher level of reliability is due to the cost of frequent replacement; this is also reflected in 
the optimal schedule where frequency of replacement increases with increased reliability 
target. Appearance of successive replacement also observed in the schedule. It is 
understandable that in the extreme scenario of 100% target reliability, replacement (R) 
becomes the only option. When a plant can be operated with lower level of reliability, regular 
maintenance can be carried out instead of replacement. In the proposed methodology, the 
maintenance schedule is developed by minimizing the cost while considering variable target 
reliability. The user can then choose from a list of alternative schemes to decide maintenance 
schedule over a period of time considering budgetary constraints. Generally gas processing 
facility target to achieve and operate with the reliability in the range of 90% to 95%. 
Considering this, two maintenance schedule obtained using Pareto-front is presented in Table 
5-6 and Table 5-7. The optimum schedule suggested by this integrated approach to achieve 
90% system reliability produces a maintenance cost of $34210 and for a 95% reliability 
results $42926.75 for two years period. The optimized schedule is an outcome while 
maximizing reliability and minimizing cost. The Pareto frontier is representative of this fact. 
The failure model is developed using expected number of failures while estimating the 
maintenance cost. The outcome of the simulation run confirms that the inspection is not 
directly affecting the reliability. Hence, at lower level of reliability we expect more 
inspections and lower cost. In other case, maintenance and replacement is dominating, as 
they affect the reliability.  
One of the outputs of the Pareto Front is that the analyst can select externally the best 
maintenance strategies considering various possible restrictions imposed over the solution 
simultaneously. Hence the analyst can analyze afterword every solution of each Pareto front 
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score based on reliability and cost. Additionally each of the 500 generation calculated in the 
front is related to specific schedule, so the decision maker can select a schedule of the Pareto 
front according to his or her preference knowing that the elected solution will accomplish all 
the imposed constraints. Maintenance and reliability team can effectively utilize the 
presented model to design maintenance activities such as inspection, maintenance and 
replacement to meet their organizational goals. Further in case of an equipment unexpected 
failures, the model need to be updated to develop a revised schedule for the remaining 
period. 
 
Figure 5-7: Pareto Front - Total Maintenance Cost Subject to Reliability Constraints 
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Table 5-6: Inspection and Maintenance Schedule for Target Reliability of 90% 
Total Cost = $ 34210.55 and Reliability = 90.0% 
m Planning Horizon (Month) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
           0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 
1 I M M I I R R R M M M M M R M M R M M I M R M M 
2 I M M I I M I I I R M M M R M I M M I I M I M I 
3 I R I M R M M I I M M R M M I I R M I M M M M M 
4 I M M M I M M I I M I R M I I I I I I I M I I I 
5 I I R M M I I I M M M M M M M M M I M M M I I M 
6 I M M M I R M I R M R M M M M M R M R M M R R M 
7 I M R M M M R M R M M I R M M M I M R R M I M M 
 
 
Table 5-7: Inspection and Maintenance Schedule for Target Reliability of 95% 
Total Cost = $ 42926.75 and Reliability = 95.0% 
m Planning Horizon (Month) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
           0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 
1 I R M M M M I R M M M R M R I M R I R M M M M M 
2 I R M M M M M R M R M I I I R M M R M M M I I M 
3 I M M M M M R M M R I M R I R I M R M M R R M M 
4 I M R I M I M M I M I M R M M M M I I I I M I I 
5 I I R I R M I I M M M M R M M I M M I R M I I I 
6 I M M R M M M M R R M M M R R M M R R I R M M M 
7 I M R R M R M M R M R R R M M M R M M I R M M M 
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5.8 Conclusions 
This paper proposes a multi-constrained, bi-objective non-linear optimization models 
using GA for maintenance scheduling for a section of a sweetening unit of a hydrocarbon 
processing facility. The proposed simulation based approach presented in the study, provides 
an optimal schedule for inspection, maintenance and replacement activities to achieve a 
reliable performance of the facility considering the facility shutdown. A well planned 
maintenance schedule generated from the Pareto-optimal solution, such as presented here 
will not only help to reduce the overall maintenance cost, increase the reliability of the 
facility but also minimize unnecessary shutdown of the facility. Typically a shutdown of a 
LNG producing facility generates a significant financial impact, resulting in millions of 
dollars in loss of production. The developed risk-based equipment selection strategy helps to 
minimize such event of loss production due triggered from the shutdown for maintenance of 
the unit. 
The proposed model has been successfully applied to obtain and optimize 
maintenance schedule for a gas sweetening unit, without provoking the facility shutdown. 
The proposed methodology, when extended to the complete plant will multiply the savings 
further, due to reduction in number of planned facility shutdown to maintain the desired 
reliability. Overall this methodology helps in developing an effective resource utilization 
planning. Pareto-optimal model provides flexibility to engineers and planners to develop 
maintenance schedules considering different conflicting objectives.  
The overall results derived from the proposed optimization models confirm the 
applicability of the approach to real world maintenance scheduling optimization problem and 
its application to other asset intensive industries where these actions are important to ensure 
   
 170 
safety, availability and reliability of the facilities. The proposed optimization methodology 
can be applied to any facility such as process or non-process.  
In the future work, proposed methodology can be extended to solve non-linear 
optimization problem for maintenance scheduling with many other meta-heuristics such as 
Harmony Search algorithm, Tabu Search, and Simulated Annealing.  This can assist in 
benchmarking the performance of the proposed GA with the other meta-heuristics. This 
problem of scheduling can also be revisited considering inflationary conditions as well.  The 
current model has risk-neutral analysis to the problem, and interesting future work could be 
used to customize the schedule, based on the firm’s risk tolerance attitude.
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6 Chapter6 
 
Conclusion, Contributions and future work 
6.1 Introduction 
The development of an optimal shutdown interval for inspection and maintenance 
considering the uncertainty surrounding the age-based wear-out or degradation of systems or 
equipment is vital for the safe operation of a processing plant. A carefully planned inspection 
and maintenance strategy not only mitigates the effect of age based degradation but also 
reduces the threat of risk exposure. During the operational life of a facility, the only way to 
prevent component failure is through optimal maintenance strategy which can facilitate 
inspection, repair, overhaul or replacement. Some of the maintenance and inspection 
activities can be completed while the processing unit is in operations; however some of the 
equipment requires the processing unit to be in a non-operational state, usually called 
shutdown. These maintenance and inspection activities involve cost, shutdown, and a 
likelihood of having a reduced life due to induced human error. If the interval between 
subsequent shutdown, maintenance and inspection tasks is too long, it may result in a number 
of premature failures of components, which will result in higher economic consequences. On 
the other hand, if the shutdown maintenance and inspection is performed very often, it will 
not only increase the overall cost but also the possibility of induced human error. This is why 
a careful inspection and maintenance shutdown interval is required. Finding an optimal 
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shutdown interval, after taking into consideration the uncertainty, is a challenging task. 
Failures due to wear-out, corrosion, erosion etc., can be modeled stochastically. Existing 
maintenance strategies e.g., preventive maintenance, and condition based maintenance are 
formulated on the probability of component failure only. However, the risk-based 
maintenance and inspection strategy is a new paradigm change. A risk-based methodology 
not only considers the probability of a failure of the equipment but also the possible 
consequences of the failure. The economic consequences of a failure include the cost of 
breakdown, production loss due to facility shutdown, consequence of environmental damage, 
consequence of asset damage and cost of liability. Inspection and maintenance tasks 
inherently have economic consequences such as cost of inspection, cost of repair, cost of 
technical support, cost of replacement parts, labor and equipment cost. Keeping in mind the 
importance of the probability of failure and its consequences, the risk based inspection and 
maintenance strategy proposed  in this thesis provides a legitimate choice for the decision 
making process regarding the shutdown interval. In this proposed work, the reduction of risk 
to a reasonably low and practicable level is considered to ensure that the risk-based shutdown 
inspection and maintenance strategy maintains the safety of operations through the optimal 
utilization of resources. The proposed optimization methodology is a trade-off between the 
cost of failure, shutdown and the benefits of risk reduction, achieved by the optimal 
shutdown interval in terms of increased safety, availability and reliability. 
6.2 Research Contributions 
In this proposed research, a methodology is developed and presented to estimate and 
manage the shutdown of complex processing units or facilities which operate on a 24 hours 
   
 173 
and 365 days basis.  The decision to shut-down a unit or facility is an important and a key 
decision for operating companies as this may produce a severe negative impact on their 
financial health. However, the benefits of having a best planned shutdown strategy will not 
only help to achieve high availability and reliability, low maintainability, and low overall 
cost but importantly will also minimize the operational risk. The availability of very limited 
shutdown modeling for inspection and maintenance for processing facilities provides us an 
opportunity to work on this topic, and to develop methodologies that can be applied and used 
to benefit operating companies in achieving their financial objectives. As discussed earlier, 
reliability, availability and cost are the three facet of risk. 
The major contributions of this research are summarized as follows: 
 A framework to estimate the risk-based shutdown interval for a processing plant 
Asset intensive industries such as oil and gas and petrochemical plants operate 
on a continuous basis. Planning inspection on maintenance on individual equipment 
will result in a significant impact on the operability as well as financial losses to the 
shareholders. In order to minimize these impacts, a frame work to estimate shutdown 
inspection and maintenance interval estimation on risk-based strategy is developed. 
This research analyzes the unit or facility by developing a risk-based equipment 
selection considering risk. The proposed research outlines the risk by estimating 
consequences considering various hazards. The proposed methodology is applied to 
develop shutdown interval for a LNG producing unit.  
 A risk-based methodology to estimate shutdown interval considering system 
availability  
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A novel risk-based approach to estimate the shutdown inspection and 
maintenance interval considering system availability using Markov process is 
presented. The proposed methodology reduces the risk of exposure to the operating 
company and shareholders for planning facility shutdown by maintaining the desired 
availability. This methodology ensures that the unit or plant is not only available for 
production but also the overall risk exposure meets the acceptance criteria. 
Considering and minimizing risk while planning for shutdown interval not only 
enhances the availability but also the safety and operation of the facility. The 
proposed methodology minimizes the financial consequences for an operating 
company due to production loss, loss of assets, safety (e.g., injury or loss of life) and 
environmental consequences.  
 A risk-based shutdown inspection and maintenance interval considering human 
error for a processing facility  
Repair is the maintenance action that restores the equipment to its operating 
conditions. Some repair actions restore equipment to a new condition while others are 
classed as minimal repair, i.e., they restore equipment to the condition prior to its 
failure. However, in reality, an equipment is likely to be restored to a condition 
between these two states. Occasionally, repairs may introduce faults in the equipment. 
A majority of the maintenance models find the optimum maintenance and inspection 
interval under the assumption that after maintenance action, the system or equipment 
state will be as good as new. Other researchers have studied the impact of imperfect 
maintenance while optimizing the maintenance and inspection interval. However, in 
both the cases the optimization is performed considering individual equipment and 
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the impact of facility shutdown while optimizing the maintenance and inspection 
interval is not taken into account. The novel idea presented in this work is to link 
various mechanics which can induce human error during inspection and maintenance 
activities. SLIM methodology is deployed to estimate HEP for each set of inspection 
and maintenance activities. Estimated HEP is then integrated in the probability of 
system failure. Shutdown inspection and maintenance consequences of selected 
equipment are determined and expressed in financial values ($). Integration of HEP 
results in obtaining a better risk profile, which is later used to optimize the shutdown 
interval. 
 Risk-based maintenance scheduling for a LNG gas sweetening unit 
The previous three proposed articles help to develop an optimized shut down 
inspection and maintenance interval for the operating facility. In this paper, a multi-
constrained, bi-objective maintenance scheduling optimization model is proposed 
using genetic algorithms. The genetic algorithm model was developed using 
MATLAB (Version 2015b) to solve this non-linear optimization problem. The 
proposed simulation based approach presented in the study, provides an optimal 
schedule for inspection, maintenance and replacement activities to achieve a reliable 
performance of the facility considering, the facility shutdown. Inspection, 
maintenance and replacement are considered as the three possible sets of activities to 
develop the schedule. Overall, this methodology helps in developing an effective 
planning for resource utilization. The developed Pareto-optimal model provides 
flexibility to engineers and planners to develop maintenance schedules considering 
different conflicting objectives.  
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6.3 Conclusions 
Inspection and maintenance optimization using mathematical modeling and 
simulation of the stochastic process is a growing area of research. A critical review of 
literature shows that there is a need for a robust risk-based inspection and maintenance model 
considering the process plant shutdown to help make an informed decision. In this 
dissertation, new models, approaches and algorithms have been explored to estimate and 
manage the shutdown interval for complex hydrocarbon processing units.  
The risk of equipment failure and its consequences on availability and reliability are 
vital for the hydrocarbon industry. In order to achieve a desired reliability and availability, 
these units are mostly taken out of service, i.e., put on “shutdown”. If the shutdown of the 
unit or facility is not planned considering the risk, it will produce a severe negative financial 
impact on the operating companies and their shareholders. By combining the probability of 
failure and the consequences of failure, an optimal strategy is proposed for developing 
shutdown interval. 
The inspection and maintenance management and optimization is encouraging 
operating companies and engineers to invest efforts in this domain to meet the availability 
and reliability of the facilities. However, the emphasis is found to be very limited when 
planning for shutdown of the facility and is generally based on Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM) suggested intervals. The aim of this proposed risk-based shutdown 
strategy for a processing facility is to provide an optimal interval. This optimal shutdown 
interval will not only improve the reliability and availability of the plant but will also protect 
human life, financial investment and the environment. 
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The key areas covered in this research include efforts to develop a risk-based frame 
work for shutdown interval modeling, risk-based shutdown interval optimization considering 
required availability, integrating human errors in shutdown interval optimization model, and 
finally developing a risk-based maintenance schedule for the facility, considering shutdown.  
In conclusion, the proposed methodologies will contribute to processing plant 
industries in providing a methodology for shutdown interval optimization. Most important, 
the proposed methodology not only takes account the uncertainty and variability by using 
stochastic modeling but also the economic consequence of failure.  
 In conclusion, it is envisaged that this research will effectively contribute to the field 
by providing a wide range of solutions to industry in terms of shutdown interval estimation 
and management. This proposal is an attempt to overcome the shortcomings of the existing 
methodologies published in the literature, which fail to capture the impact of overall facility 
shutdown in long duration operations. In this work an attempt has been made to overcome 
the said limitation and provide a novel solution to optimize shutdown interval with a risk-
based approach. 
6.4 Recommendations for future research work 
Inspection and maintenance optimization is in focus since the last few decades. 
However, consideration of shutdown interval for inspection and maintenance is found to be 
very limited in literature. In this proposed research, a methodology to develop shutdown 
interval for a processing facility is presented considering the risk, availability, reliability,  
imperfect maintenance and finally genetic algorithms are applied to develop a maintenance 
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schedule.  Along with the key development, there is always an option to enhance or extend 
the proposed work. Some of the suggestions are discussed in this section. 
1. In the presented research, a risk profile is developed considering the 
consequences due to safety hazards, production loss and inspection and maintenance costs. 
Generally, operating companies operate with the resources which can meet their ongoing 
operations, however for shutdown they need to hire additional manpower, tools and purchase 
spares. This work can be extended to optimize shutdown interval optimization including 
other constraints such as inspection and maintenance manpower, tools and spares availability 
and their financial impact on shutdown planning. Consideration of these in generating a risk 
profile will provide a better insight into the optimization problem. 
2. In the present work a risk-based shutdown interval methodology is explored 
considering the availability of the facility. Here, the proposed methodology has considered a 
constant failure and repair rate in determining a steady state availability to obtain the risk-
based shutdown interval. This work can be extended to develop state dependent models with 
different failure behaviors. The flexibility of state-dependent models will help to develop 
various failure modes that will result in obtaining a better representation of the situation.   
3.  A planned shutdown helps in utilizing the available resources to minimize the 
operational risk. For any shutdown planning, multiple tasks can be considered such as no 
action can be planned on certain equipment of the facility, and/or the equipment is left to 
operate and continues to age with the same failure rate. An inspection, maintenance and 
repair action may be scheduled and in some cases a decision may be made to replace the 
equipment. These tasks will generate a detailed shutdown schedule for the considered 
equipment. Developing a detailed time schedule for a specific shutdown will help taking 
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account the uncertainties in completing these tasks and will lead to forecasting the actual 
shutdown duration. This in turn will help the operating companies to adjust their risk 
tolerance considering the impact of their delivery schedule and commitments. 
4. Shutdown interval optimization for inspection and maintenance is considered 
to ensure the safety, reliability, and availability of the units and the facility. In this research, a 
simulation based Pareto-optimal solutions using genetic algorithms for multi-constrained 
maintenance scheduling optimization are discussed for the equipment which can be inspected 
and maintained without taking the facility in shutdown. The proposed methodology can be 
extended to solve non-linear optimization problems for shutdown maintenance scheduling 
with meta-heuristics such as Harmony Search algorithm (Geem, Kim, & Loganathan, 2001), 
Tabu Search (Glover, 1998), and Simulated Annealing (Kirkpatrick, 1984), etc.   
5. Further, the shutdown interval optimization problem can be coupled with 
inflationary conditions to generate a risk profile for shutdown interval planning and decision 
making. 
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